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THE MONARCHIST MOVEMENT AND THE DECLARATION OF 1911

D. Miguel de Almeida (Lavradio)

This essay is concerned with the events leading up to, and including the Monarchist movement, and the subsequent Declaration issued by the King, D. Manuel II, and it is aiming to give an explanation to the eventual cessation of the movement itself.

Obviously, the main question is: why did the Monarchists give up, in their bid to replace the King on the throne? This is the question that the essay attempts to answer; in which it can be seen that if the Declaration was not the only factor leading to the downfall of the movement, it was by far the one that most helped it to collapse.

There has not been much literature published concerning this subject, and so naturally I decided to pick it up, especially as it is related to my family. I hope that it will provide a good idea of what really happened at this time, which was so vital for Portugal.

The essay is organised in a time space of approximately four years, starting from the time that the regicide was committed, and passing through various phases, such as the King's exile and the situation in Portugal after the proclamation of the Republic, in 1910. It ends with the Declaration, and the effect it had on both the movement and various personalities connected with it.

Unfortunately, there is no more space in this essay to answer the various questions that are constantly arising, such as: What were the internal factors that led to the collapse of the movement? Or, Why did England not allow the intervention of Spain? Hope goes out to anyone who will pick this subject up and answer these questions.

Editor's note: All the notes in the text will be found in Appendix I or Appendix II with the exception of those listed below the text.

INTRODUCTION — A BACKGROUND TO 1911

Republican movements had been generating in Portugal for more than one hundred years before the actual 'take-over' in 1910. These movements were particularly influenced by the French Revolutions of 1848.

It was in the 1870's that Republicanism ceased to be just limited to an intellectual group, and passed on to become a major option for the Portuguese political problem.

Although it had a lot of support, there was wide belief that, economically, Portugal was totally unprepared. One such person was A. Briand, the French president, who said that "It is foolish; Portugal is too poor to have a Republic. Republics are much more expensive than Monarchies".¹

There were, however, some people who believed that a Republican revolution was inevitable. In a letter to the Marquis of Lavradio, written after the revolution, José Lobo writes that "(...) what happened on the 4th and on the 5th would have happened in a month's time, in a year's time, as soon as there was opportunity for it."²

The revolution started on the 3rd of October, 1910. Unfortunately, it was believed by the Monarchists that such a revolution would never really be successful, as the plans had been known by the government for some time. So sure were they that the revolution would fail, that the King, D. Manuel II, had arranged an interview with the President of the Municipal Chamber of Lisbon in the following days.

In fact, no measures had been taken. In the S. Carlos square, guns had been distributed to the revolutionaries throughout the afternoon without any police intervention at all. The navy and army had not been put on 'standby' and all the commanders of the various ships had not been warned. Had the navy been warned in time, it is possible that the revolution would have failed, if not, been delayed, as two of the main 'protagonists' were the cruiser *S. Rafael*, and the Sailors' barracks.

The revolution was successful, and a Portuguese Republic was proclaimed on October 5th, 1910.

The Royal family was able to get away, and at Ericeira boarded the Royal Yacht *Amélia*, bound for Gibraltar. Here, the party went separate ways. The King went on to England with some of his loyal supporters, while the King's grandmother departed for her native Italy.

However, the Monarchic movement was by no means dead. There were two incursions made in the north, in 1911, and 1912. The first incursion, of October 1911, led to the controversial 'Declaration' issued by D. Manuel II on the 31st of that month, and which led to the abandonment of the Monarchist cause. The causes leading up to the First Incursion and the 'Declaration' are analysed in this essay, as are the effects on important personalities to the cause, and especially on the cause itself.

Although the Republic was proclaimed in October 1910, Republican ideologies, as said before, had started much earlier. One important consequence was the assassination of the King, D. Carlos I, and of the heir, D. Luis Filipe.

THE REGICIDE


At the beginning of this century, political life in Portugal was not running as well as expected.

Personal divergencies in political leaders had reached its peak, and the King, D. Carlos, decided to intervene in the running of the government, which brought disastrous results to the Monarchy.³

The resulting regime had much opposition, and on the 28th of January, 1908, a revolution was organised by the Republicans and the Dissident Progressists. Although it was crushed at the start, it led the regenerator party to admit that "this will end with a revolution or with a crime."⁴

Unfortunately they were right. On the 1st of February, 1908, the King, D. Carlos, and his son and heir, D. Luis Filipe, were both assassinated in the Terreiro do Paço, on their way to the Palácio das Necessidades. They were returning from Vila Viçosa⁵ after a month's absence from Lisbon. The two murderers — Buiça and Costa — were immediately

5. Palácio das Necessidades was the Royal Family's official residence in Lisbon. Vila Viçosa was the Royal Family's official residence in the Alentejo.



The Marquis of Lavradio with, from the left, the Count of Sabugosa, King D. Manuel, Colonel Guerreiro, the Marquis of Faial and Fernando de Serpa.

killed by loyal Monarchists, one being killed by the Heir himself.⁶ It was difficult for any Monarchist to imagine that such a crime could be committed by any Portuguese. In a letter to the new King, D. Manuel II, D. João de Almeida says "Of the terrible event I cannot speak; It became stuck in my heart and I cannot think of such a crime. But this crime was not committed by Portuguese, even if any of the assassins has a Portuguese name, he has not been so for a long time! They are International Anarchists and cannot be called Portuguese."⁷

This tragic assassination was given no special mention in the papers, which treated it like a murder in Lisbon's poorest quarters. In the streets, there was little or no sign of mourning, and the people seemed afraid to show their sorrow in face of the terrible crime committed. This led the Marquis of Lavradio to write in his memoirs "The death of the King is not felt and that of the Royal Prince did not raise one wave of revolt in the people's spirits".⁸

D. MANUEL II — PORTUGAL'S LAST REIGNING MONARCH

D. Manuel was the previous King's second son, and only eighteen years of age when he came to the throne. As he said himself the day after his father and brother were murdered "(. . .) very young and without the experience or knowledge to be King."⁹ Hence he needed, more than ever, the support and advice of his advising council. It was here that he made a mistake in taking their advice to dismiss the present government headed by João Franco, replacing it with a coalition under Admiral Ferreira do Amaral, and abolishing all dictatorship laws. On receiving notice of this, King Edward VII of England turned to the Marquis of Soveral and said "What kind of country is this where a King and Prince are killed and the first measure taken is to dismiss the government? The revolution has triumphed, has it not?"¹⁰

During the new King's reign, Republicanism grew enormously. This was mainly due to the new government, which, as a contrast to the previous one, was soft towards the opposition. This Republican favouritism culminated in June of 1910 in which they gained Lisbon in the elections.

OCTOBER 5th, 1910 — REVOLUTION!

From the years 1908 to 1910, seven governments went into office, all but the last being supported by José Luciano de Castro. This man was able to control politics backstage. He was the King's, and hence the Monarchy's confidant and advisor and so the political situation of Portugal depended almost entirely on his approval of the King's decisions, and as a politician said "José Luciano is sick and has been destroying the Monarchist parties for four or five years, and if he goes on being listened to, he will destroy the Monarchy".¹¹ He can be considered one of the main culprits for the revolution's triumph.

One of the main criticisms of this time goes to the various derogatory literary works that were published at this time and which deeply offended not only the King but all of his most loyal followers.¹² Censorship of these works was never effective which allowed an even greater freedom of the Republican party and, at the same time, corruption of the various politicians and political parties. The ultimate blunder of the politicians was the revolution itself. The plot was known to both politicians and King and therefore it was likely to be crushed. On the 3rd, however, when the fighting started, the army and navy leaders were completely unprepared, three of the most important having finished lunch with the King only minutes earlier.

An explicit account of the first few days in October of 1910 is to be found in a letter from José Lobo to the Marquis of Lavradio.¹³ After being overrun by the combined forces of the Republicans and civilian organisations,¹⁴ the army fled to Queluz, and the Republic was proclaimed. At this time, the royal family fled to exile.

EXILE — THE KING IN ENGLAND

The Royal Yacht *Amélia* embarked the Royal Family at Ericeira and left for Gibraltar. Here, the party went different ways. D. Manuel II continued on to England, where he died on the 2nd of July, 1932.¹⁵ His grand-

14. The civilian organisations were essentially the Masonry and the Carbonaria.
15. There was strong suspicion towards the King's doctor, as he had sent the King home after examining him, promising that he would see him an hour later. He took longer, and when he finally arrived, the King was already dead.

mother, Queen D. Maria Pia, went on to her native Italy accompanied by Lieutenant Vitor Sepulvada. She was later joined by her son, D. Afonso, and died in July 1911.

The King had originally wanted to go to Oporto, and join the Monarchist movement that had already been formed; but this was strongly opposed by various people, including his uncle, D. Afonso.

The yacht, *Victoria & Albert* took the King, his mother (Queen D. Amélia) and his uncle to England where they were met by the Duke of Orleans (pretender to the French throne). They then went on to his house in Woodnorton, where they stayed until being moved to Abercorn, a house in Richmond, ironically situated on the King's Road.

THE SITUATION IN PORTUGAL

From Lisbon, there came bad news: the adherents to the Republican party were increasing in large numbers, and even people who had been relatively close to the Royal Family were giving their support. One example of this came from a naval officer, an extremely close friend of the King himself.

A wave of terror and persecutions swept over the country, as certain members of parliament, such as João Franco, were put in gaol. The drawers of the King's desks were broken into, as the new government looked for incriminating documents but as the Marquis of Lavradio says in his memoirs: "nothing appeared, because they didn't, and never had, existed."¹⁶ Religious orders were persecuted, and the monks and nuns were laughed and scorned at, their houses torn apart by the rabble. That was how Portugal was at this time: torn apart. But, as with the October Revolution, a letter (this time from Tavares Proença) to the Marquis of Lavradio helps to give a better image of the country's problems at this time.¹⁷

THE MONARCHIC MOVEMENT IN THE NORTH

The Portuguese Monarchists were not the only ones who wanted to restore the King, and thus the Monarchy; next door, in Spain, preparations were being made by the King, Afonso XIII, to intervene in Portugal

in the King's favour. In the first months of 1911, he went especially to England, and asked the government not to oppose his entry into Portugal, as it was not convenient to have an anarchic Republic for a neighbour.¹⁸ In fact, Spain did not intervene, as England was against it.

On the 20th of March, 1911, Henrique de Paiva Couceiro,¹⁹ sent an exposition to the Portuguese government criticising them, and saying how unstable they actually were. As a result of this, he left Portugal and went to stay in Vigo, a city in Spain to the north of Portugal. This was no small threat. The government was so afraid of what this could lead to, that they sent Freire de Andrade, Couceiro's great friend and army companion to persuade him to return. He turned them down.

As it turned out, the government was right; many loyal monarchists went to join Couceiro in Vigo. Every day, there appeared young men with one sole objective: "The Monarchy." In a letter to the Marquis of Lavradio, D. José L. de Saldanha expresses his feeling towards these men, saying "(. . .) they who are the heroes of Africa, the few Portuguese that ever did anything for the father-land (. . .). Will they succumb? Will they be beaten? Well it is a pity! It is in them, and only in them that resides the Portuguese blood".²⁰

Couceiro and his companions, due to advice from D. Afonso XIII, now moved to Sant'Iago. They knew that without the support of D. Manuel, it would be extremely difficult to obtain money, therefore, they sent for the Marquis of Lavradio, the King's personal secretary, with this aim. They said that it would be possible to acquire money in Galicia if they had promissory notes accepted by the King. Money came not only from the King but also from devout monarchists such as the Marquis of Faial (later Duke of Palmela), who did not hesitate in donating sums such as 4,000 pounds. Despite this, everything was going too slowly; time was of the essence. In Portugal, it was getting harder every day to carry out the monarchist work. In Braga, for example, there were numerous arrests, and hundreds of blue and white (monarchist) flags were apprehended, and in Figueira, the commander of the artillery regiment was arrested (this regiment was known to be all monarchic).

Attempts were also made to acquire warships, although they were not successful.

19. Henrique de Paiva Couceiro was a devout Monarchist and an excellent military strategist who led the Monarchists in the first Incursion.

Meanwhile, difficulties were growing from day to day. England at last recognised Portugal to be a Republic, and the King of Spain said that if the Monarchists did not enter Portugal in a determined space of time, they would be expelled from Galicia.

THE FIRST MONARCHIST INCURSION

On the 3rd of October, 1911, the Marquis of Lavradio received three telegrams from Paris, from Ayres de Ornelas. Of which the Marquis of Lavradio writes about in his memoirs: "In the first, he informed me that Couceiro should have entered on the day before, because he could not wait any longer; in the second he told me: "News from Vigo says Monarchy proclaimed in Braga, Guimarães, Chaves, Bragança, garrisons united forces Couceiro general movement against Republic; finally, in the third, he confirmed the news of the uprising in Minho and Trás-os-Montes".²¹

Couceiro had, in fact, entered into Portugal with only eight hundred men one hundred and fifty guns, and not more than thirty cartridges per man. They went in more to keep a promise than because they were actually ready. As Couceiro later wrote, it was a "satisfaction of a compromise and not a voluntary act."²² They were awaited at Bragança where the civilian and military monarchists had succeeded in damaging armaments belonging to the republican garrison. What happened was that the guides, whether on purpose or not, made a mistake and got lost, ending up, twenty-four hours later, at the starting point.

The Republican government had been waiting for Couceiro and his 'army' for some time now; the still loyal Monarchists in Portugal were restless, and a few premature revolts had broken out, which originated in a large number of arrests. The media did its utmost to incite the people against the rebels. One clear example occurred in the newspaper "República", which wrote: "If they enter the frontier, fire at them as at wolves, if they are hungry, fugitives through those hills, instead of bread give them bullets, if they are thirsty, give them turpentine to drink, if they are cold, instead of firewood to warm them, send them burning gunpowder."²³

THE DECLARATION OF 31ST OF OCTOBER, 1911

In England, the Incursion was followed with great anxiety by all, and especially the King, who telegraphed the Marquis of Lavradio (who was



The Marquis of Lavradio in his full dress uniform

in Hamburg at this time) on the 6th, saying that the news he had received from Portugal was extremely good.

However, the Incursion was destined to failure, and in England the Marquis of Soveral (Portuguese ambassador to England) openly condemned the so-called 'Couceirista movement'. His reasons for this are not clear. Possibly he did not believe in the restoration, or was afraid of complications with both England and Spain. Although his motive is not clear, what is certain is that he convinced the King to manifest himself against the movement, which he did with the following declaration, issued on the 31st of October, which led the Monarchists to lose so much hope in the restoration.


Abercorn
Richmond
Surrey

DECLARATION

I followed with great anxiety, for a few months, the work, the sacrifices, and all kinds of hardships through which my supporters have passed, devoted in the very just and patriotic aim of restoring the Monarchy to Portugal. At the same time that I show my admiration, accept also my gratitude.

I however see it confirmed that the movement dons a "neutral" character, and in it collaborate entities with completely varied ideals and who feed the hope of seeing them realised, if the country so wishes, in a future plebiscite.

As I know that I can absolutely count on the dedication of many, it is these that I now address, to declare to them that I absolutely disapprove of the movement's "neutral" character, and that I repudiate any agreement, of any kind, with the Miguelista party with which I have never had any understanding.



With the Royal party in London, the Marquis of Soveral is standing, second from the left.

I wish it also to be well stressed that this declaration does not represent, in any way, my giving up or the renunciation of my unquestionable rights and that my life's most ardent wish continued to be that of returning to my beloved fatherland and, with the collaboration of all the good Portuguese, to still ensure it of prosperous and peaceful days.

(s) D. Manuel King

Richmond, 31st of October of 1911²⁴

This declaration, cooked up by the Marquis of Soveral and the Viscount of Asseca, was aimed at the crownless flag,²⁵ which was correct, but it also touched those who were in Galicia, fighting for the Monarchy. It was considered a grave mistake by many, as well as an ingratitude not only against Paiva Couceiro, but all those who had sacrificed their careers, their well being, and also their lives to put him back on the throne. Public opinion was this: The King abandoned them now that they were beaten.

It is also to be noted that this declaration proved to be an excellent propaganda opportunity, which was well picked up by the Miguelista party.²⁶

THE CONSEQUENCES ON VARIOUS PERSONALITIES AND ON THE MOVEMENT

One of the obvious people to write about is Henrique de Paiva Couceiro, as he was the principle architect of the Incursion. The little that is known of Couceiro's reaction to the declaration is summed up in two letters that he sent to the Marquis of Lavradio. One before his having any knowledge of the declaration, written on the 3rd of November, 1911²⁷ and the other afterwards, written on the 30th of the same month.²⁸ In the first letter, he makes it known that he is already aware of the King's feelings. In the second letter his astonishment is obvious, and it is possible to see the hurt that he feels, when he knows that the King that he loved and risked his life for has rejected not only him, but all those that were involved directly and indirectly in the cause of restoring him to the throne.

25. To be considered a Monarchy, the Portuguese flag had to have a Royal crown above the coat-of-arms.

26. Chart of Braganza family tree which unfortunately did not lend itself for reproduction.

What this led to was a conference between the King and Couceiro in Richmond. It did not prove difficult to bring Couceiro to Richmond, seeing as he had been advised to do so by several people. An agreement was reached after two hours. It was simply established that Couceiro would end the neutral movement, and a basis for an understanding with D. Miguel was also fixed.

Not all Monarchists felt happy with this pact. In a letter to the Marquis of Lauradio, Alvaro Chagas wrote that "(... the Miguelista agreement — the most serious, the most shameful and the most disastrous, as well as being the most unnecessary of the political acts that the King has practised since his ascension to the throne".²⁹ As a matter of fact, the *pact* never existed.³⁰ Couceiro did not give up the cause, and he organised a second incursion, which took place in June of 1912.

Another person worth mentioning is the Marquis of Lavradio, the King's personal secretary, and out of whose memoirs much of the information in this essay is taken. Naturally, being one of the King's most devout followers, he too found it to be an insult towards those that had risked their lives in an attempt to put him back on the throne. He was the one asked to take two copies of the declaration; a thing he refused to do, "and from that date on, our relationship became extremely cold."³¹ It must be noted that the Marquis of Lavradio was the only Portuguese to have accompanied the King into exile, and actually stay with him in England.

Unfortunately, due to the declaration which he was totally against, the Marquis of Lavradio found that he could no longer be a person of the King's *political* trust, and he therefore resigned his position.

Apart from these two, there were other manifestations of discontent. On the 7th of November, Ayres de Ornelas writes in a letter to the Marquis of Lavradio that "(... I did wish His Majesty to take a *negative* attitude, but to *declare* himself beside those that work and suffer for him, and still that he *insisted* on the ending of the *neutral* mix-up and to finally declared what is *true*, which is, that the movement is for Him."³²

The count of Vilas-Boas wrote to the Marquis of Lavradio on the 15th of November, saying that "The declaration has produced a terrible effect. "(... All those who sacrificed everything to restore the King D. Manuel to the throne of Portugal feel hurt to see that the King is unin-

terested in the movement at a time that, full of hope, dedication and enthusiasm, they prepare a new attempt, in which, besides all that they have already sacrificed, they will one more time risk their lives. And I have not yet heard two opinions; *everyone* is in agreement."³³.

It can be clearly seen that public opinion was totally against the young exiled King. Surprisingly, however, the declaration did not have much effect on the movement itself, which continued as 'hot' as it had been before the unpleasant incident. In fact, there was a second incursion in June of 1912, which unfortunately did not succeed, even though Couceiro marched in with 1,000 well armed men. The failure of this incursion wiped out the supporters in Galicia, but not the supporters of the cause.

On the 16th of August, Couceiro wrote to the Marquis of Lavradio, saying that "The Cause has certainly died, for it represents principles and beliefs that have not been extinguished in everyone's heart."²³.

This second incursion led D. Manuel to write out a manifest that caused an excellent impression, and making the one that had remained from the first declaration, disappear.

Owing to various causes, such as the King's lack of interest, and the people being afraid to join any monarchist organisation, the Monarchy was never restored to Portugal. But even today, there is still hope that Portugal will once more have a Monarch sitting on a throne, and until that day, hope will never die.

BIBLIOGRAPHY USED IN EXTENDED ESSAY

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A private collection of letters to the Marquis of Lavradio
Cartas de D. Manuel II — O próprio

SECONDARY SOURCES

Historia de Portugal — A.H. de Oliveira Marques
História de Portugal X — Joaquim Verissimo Serrão
A Queda da Monarquia — Maria Filomena Monica

APPENDIX I

1. Source: *Memórias do Sexto Marques de Lavradio*, page 25. "E uma tolice; Portugal e um país muito pobre para uma República. As Repúblicas são muito mais caras do que as Monarquias."
2. Source: Letter from José Lobo to the Marquis of Lavradio, dated 6th of October, 1910. "(. . .) o que conteceu nos dias 4 e 5 aconteceria daqui a um mes, a um ano, logo que houvesse occasiao para isso."
4. Source: *Memorias do Sexto Marques de Lavradio*, page 91 "não hesitando o órgão Português regenerador em escrever: 'isto acabara por uma revolução, ou por um crime'."
7. Source: *Memórias do Sexto Marques de Lavradio*, page 127. "Sobre o terrível acontecimento não posso falar; ficou-me cravado no coração e não posso pensar em tal crime. Mas não foram Portugueses que cometeram esse crime, mesmo e algum dos assassinos tem nome português, há já muito tempo que o não é! São anarquistas internacionais que não se podem chamar Portugueses".
8. Source: *Memórias do Sexto Marques de Lavradio*, page 102. "Neste dia escrevi: 'A morte de El-Rei não o sentida e a do Principe Real não levantou uma onda de revolta no espírito popular'."
9. Source: *Memórias do Sexto Marques de Lavradio*, page 103. "O conselho foi daqueles que ficam marcados na História. El-rei ao abri-lo, declarou que "muito novo e sem experiência nem educação para Rei" esperava que o aconselhassem sobre a forma de proceder para o bem do País."
10. Source: *Memórias do Sexto Marques de Lavradio*, page 103. "Que país é esse onde matam um Rei e um Príncipe e a primeira medida que se toma e demitir o Ministerio? A revolução triunfou, não e verdade?"
11. Source: Letter from D. João de Almeida to the Marquis of Lavradio, dated 12th of April, 1909, and written in Vienna. This extract is actually taken from a diplomat's letter to D. João de Almeida.
José Luciano está doente e está há quatro ou cinco anos a dar cabo dos partidos Monárquicos e, se continuam a ouvi-lo, há-de dar cabo de Monarquia
16. Source: *Memórias do Sexto Marques de Lavradio*, page 168. "As gavetas de El-rei eram arrombadas a procura de documentos comprometedores, mas . . . nada apparecia, porque não existiam, nem nunca tinham existido."

20. Source: Letter from D. José L. de Saldanha to the Marquis of Lavradio, dated 16th of June, 1911, and written in Lisbon. "Não posso deixar de admirar a atitude daquela minoria de gente que esta na fronteira (. . .) 'eles que são os heróis de África, os poucos Portugueses que alguma coisa fizeram pela Pátria e que não empregaram a sua actividade em dirigir fabricação de explosivos em Chelas ou trair os seus juramentos. Simpaticos rapazes. fabricação de explosivos em Chelas ou trair os seus juramentos. Simpaticos rapazes. Sucumbirão? Serão vencidos? Pois é pena! E neles e só neles que reside o sangue português'."
21. Source: *Memórias do Sexto Marquez de Lavradio*, page 204. "No dia 3 recebia três telegramas de Paris do Ayres de Ornelas: 'no primeiro comunicava-me que o Couceiro devia ter entrado na vespera, porque não podia esperar mais; no segundo dizia-me: notícias Vigo dizem monarquia proclamada Braga, Guimarães, Braganca, guarnições unidas forcas Couceiro movimento geral contra República'; finalmente, no terceiro confirmava a notícia do levantamento do Minho e Tras-os-Montes', acrescentando: "Julgo conveniente Infante seguir urgência".
22. *Memórias do Sexto Marquez de Lavradio* page 206.
23. Source: *Memórias do Sexto Marquez de Lavradio*, page 207. "Se eles entrarem a fronteira, atirem-lhes como a lobos, se tiverem fome, foragidos por esses montes, em lugar de pão deem-lhes balas, se tiverem sede, deem-lhes aguarras a baber, se tiverem frio, em lugar de linha que os aqueça, mandem-lhes pólvora a arder".
24. Original Portuguese version of the Declaration.

Abercorn,
Richmond,
Surrey

DECLARAÇÃO

"Segui com a maior ansiedade, durante uns poucos de meses, os trabalhos, os sacrificios, as privações de toda a espécie por que passaram os meus partidários de toda a espécie por que passaram os meus partidários empenhados no tão justo como patriótico intuito de restaurar a Monarquia em Portugal. Ao mesmo tempo que lhes significo a minha admiração, recebam também os meus agradecimentos.

"Vejo, entretanto, confirmado que o movimento reveste o caracter "neutral", colaborando nele entidades com ideais completamente diversos e que alimentam a esperanca de os ver conseguidos, se o Pais assim o decidir, num futuro plebiscito.

"Como sei que posso absolutamente contar com a dedicação de muitos, a estes me dirijo, para lhes declarar que reprovoo completamente o carácter "neutral" do movimento e que repudio igualmente todo o acordo, de qualquer espécie que seja, com o partido miguelista, com o qual nunca tive entendimento algum.

"Desejo também que fique bem acentuado que esta minha declaração não representa, de forma alguma, desistência ou renuncia dos meus incontestáveis direitos e que o mais ardente desejo da minha vida continua sendo o de regressar a minha Pátria e, com a colaboração de todos os bons Portugueses, assegurar-lhe ainda dias de paz e prosperidade.

(a) D. MANUEL REI

"Richmond, 31 de Outubro de 1911".

29. Source: Letter to the Marquis of Lavradio from Álvaro Chagas, dated 24th of January, 1912. "O acordo miguelista, o mais grave, o mais vergonhoso e o mais desastrado, ao mesmo tempo que o mais desnecessário dos actos políticos, que El-Rei tem praticado desde que subiu ao trono".
31. Source: *Memórias do Sexto Marquez de Lavradio*, page 209. "El-Rei não me disse nada, mas, a partir dessa data, as nossas relações ficaram extremamente frias."
32. Source: Letter from Ayres de Ornelas to the Marquis of Lavradio, dated 7th of November, 1911. "Respondi logo que nunca pensara em tal consequencia," que não desejava que S. M. tomasse uma atitude *negativa*, mas sim se *afirmasse* ao lado dos que trabalham e sofrem por ele, e ainda que *exigisse* que acabasse a tal trapalhada do *neutro* e se declarasse afinal o que é *verdade*, isto é, que o movimento é para Ele".
33. Source: Letter from the Count of Vilas-Boas to the Marquis of Lavradio, dated 15th of November, 1911. "Todos os que todos sacrificaram para repor no Trono de Portugal a El-Rei D. Manuel sentem-se magoados por verem que El-Rei se desinteressa do movimento no momento em que, cheios de esperanca, de dedicação e de entusiasmo preparam uma nova tentativa, em que, além de tudo o que sacrificaram já, vão ainda arriscar, mais uma vez, a vida. E não ouvi ainda duas opiniões; *todos* estão de acordo."
34. Source: Letter from Henrique de Paiva Couceiro to the Marquis of Lavradio, dated 16th of August, 1912 "A Causa, essa, não morreu decerto, porque representa principios e crenças que não estão apagados no peito de todos."

APPENDIX II

Quotes to support facts used in the essay

3. "By 1906, personal divergences between party leaders had reached their maximum limit. The Royal court sessions were nothing but turbulent and useless reunions, to discuss partisan questions. (...) At last resolved to intervene and try the new life that everyone was asking for, the king D. Carlos forced Hintze Ribeiro to resign, refusing him the once more solicited parliamentary dissolutions. João Franco was charged with forming a ministry, D. Carlos conceding him the dissolution he had denied the regenerator leader. Having a proper majority in the new chambers, and with the support of the Progressists, he tried constitutionally for some months, 'the English way', as he put it. Soon, however, the precarious alliance dissolved, and João Franco decided, with the monarch's full support, to turn to the dictatorship. Taking advantage of the excuse of the parliamentary obstruction stirred up by the Opposition due to the academic strike of 1907, the king dissolved the courts, without there being a date set for the next elections.
- The consequences were revealed to be disastrous to the regime. Franco had against him the overwhelming majority of the organised forces of the country and he had to depend, especially, on regal support. However, and by the initiative of the President of the Council who presented himself with the intention of radically changing the administration and thus "hunt on the same publicans" (as he said), it was brought to the knowledge of the public that the royal family was in debt to the state by important sums of money, that all the governments had been "advancing", for years, with the excuse that the endowment that had been officially set was insufficient. This "question of loans" led to a violent campaign against the Monarchy to which the rotative parties associated themselves, loudly or otherwise.
- Violence and repression characterised the second year of João Franco's government. In April of 1907, the students of Coimbra went into a prolonged strike which was so full of tumultuous aspects that, shortly, it converted itself into a general movement against the government. On the 29th of January, 1908, Republica and Dissident-Progressists organised and put on to the streets, a revolution that was able to be stifled at the start. Many directors of both parties were put in gaol. João Franco put forward a decree, with the royal signature, that punished any individuals guilty of severe political crimes with banishment to the colonies — which was regarded by many to be equivalent to death. It was aimed especially at the republican directors, whose campaign of agitation against the Monarchy was intensifying. On the following 1st of February, D. Carlos and the heir apparent, D. Luís Filipe, fell, assassinated in Lisbon by republican elements acting individually, while D. Manuel was slightly hurt."
- Source: *História de Portugal*, vol. III; pages 42-43.

6. "The Prince had fulfilled what he had so many times declared: one of the assassins —

Costa — had been killed by one of His Highness's bullets from his revolver."

Source: *Memórias do Sexto Marques de Lavradio*, page 99.

12. "Another case, also as bad was the non-impediment of the selling and circulation of a vile book entitled "The Marquis of Bacalhoa". I received the information, on the 5th of January, that the book would soon be appearing, and on that same day I informed the count of Figueiro, who went immediately to contact the Judge of Criminal Instruction, who already had some vague information, and declared that he would soon handle the affair. Nevertheless, on the 14th, the book was put on sale in Lisbon, secretly, but not so secretly that I, on the 15th, was able to acquire a copy without difficulty.

The book, besides being slanderous, was revolutionary, and spoke against the King, against the Queen, against the people that surrounded Their Majesties, against Franco, and defended anarchism. The author, a certain António de Albuquerque, escaped to Paris, after having received, so it was said, 700,000 reis".

Source: *Memórias do Sexto Marques de Lavradio*, pages 91-92.

13. "On the third at night, the General of Division gave order for prevention of all bodies. The person in charge to do so forgot the Group and, consequently, the officers went home, remaining only one officer (lieutenant Rocha) in the barracks. At a quarter to three, orders were given over the telephone (Martins de Lima) for the Group to march to the Avenida. The officers were called, the vehicles loaded, etc. and at 4.00 o'clock orders were received from the Commander-in-Chief (Colonel Castro) to march to the Lancers' Headquarters and the leader of the battery (Vieira) was asked if he trusted the troops. A little later the battery left with four guns and four cars, but all incomplete, and with 250 grenades. They had no more and those were almost taken from them a few days ago to be returned to the warehouse which, fortunately, the general of division (Gorjão) did not consent.
- A few days before, orders had been given to give leave to the second year soldiers, hence only one incomplete battery could be organised, leaving only 7 men and one officer to defend the barracks. The latter arrived at the Lancasters' and the officers of that body said that the No. 4 Cavalry had been defeated with great losses. One could feel great shooting and bombing from the ships.
- The Commander-in-Chief (José Joaquim de Castro) telephoned, giving orders to march to the Necessidades, warning that the No. 4 Cavalry had been destroyed in Alcantara and that passage there was dangerous. The Captain (Vieira) asked him for an escort, as the battery was defenceless. He was told that there were no available forces and to march, which he did. On the sidewalks and at the windows, many people could be seen; in Alcantara it was packed, nobody said anything and everyone made way for the battery, and they arrived at the Necessidades, where there were the No. 2 *Cacadores* and the Lancers with their commander (Albuquerque). He suggested that it was best that a gun fire onto the alley which led to the square of the Navy headquarters. The leader of the battery answered that soon he could, if wanted, take two guns, one at the end of the alley, and the other at Rua do Sacramento, and assured him that with a few minutes he would make the sailors surrender. They hesitated and said that it was best to ask the General Headquarters and, after half an hour, Albuquerque said that he had received orders to form a general column with No. 2 Lancers of No. 1 Artillery.

After a long delay the column was formed and they marched by the ramparts to Campolide. On arriving at the Arço do Carvalho they received some carbine shots and the commander of the column gave orders to withdraw by the Terremotos, a Ponte de Alcantara, Pimenteira Road, Benfica, Sete Rios!!! What for?

In Sete Rios, Couceiro appeared, who, having spent the night in Cascais, was warned by an orderly. He came on the first train to the Paço de Arços and then walked to Queluz, where he mounted and left, searching for the battery.

The latter headed for the Prison and was able to place two guns in an opening in the wall of the rampart. Orders were received to open fire, without knowing where the enemy was. A group of rebels, which was at the entrance of No. 1 Artillery started to fire, the battery (2 guns) firing also onto them, destroying, at once, a wheel, making the guards flee, and making an opening in the headquarters's wall. At that time, the commander (Vieira) was wounded with a bullet in the face, along with six or seven soldiers, and lieutenant Gusmão, who was wounded on the head. Vieira had to withdraw with a swollen face, which prevented him from seeing. Couceiro took command and continued shooting. A grenade hit three men from No. 2 Infantry, which forced people to lean against the wall, and some officers took shelter further away. Couceiro, as he saw the disorder in the headquarters of the No. 1 Artillery, talked to the commander of No. 2 Infantry (Beira), saying he could go forward and, as the latter did not answer, he talked adequately to the No. 2 Infantry, asking them not to be cowardly and, if their officers did not want to lead them, and an officer from the battery would lead them, and show them the route to honour. The soldiers started to follow him but, unfortunately, a grenade hit the ground raising an enormous amount of dust, and the soldiers withdrew.

The battery found itself alone, abandoned by all who had formed the column.

Here died a few solipeds and were wounded about 14 soldiers and sergeants.

By order of the General of Brigade (Carvalho), it withdrew, joining the column led by this general and followed on to Sete Rios, Luz, Azinhaga, Campo Grande up to Rossio, always walking. At Luz they found a squadron of the Guarda Municipal, with the men on foot, and feeding the horses.

At Rossio, where they arrived almost at night, they received orders to place 2 guns in Rua do Ouro and 2 guns in Rua Augusta. They spent the night there, and, at dawn, a gun went to the gardens of Manuel de Castro Guimarães and two guns stayed next to the railway station, from where they shot efficiently at the rebels in the Rotunda. The officer who was at the Torel saw, after each shot, the rebels fleeing and abandoning the guns and the barricade, but the monarchist infantry did not move. The confusion within the rebel forces was great, and 100 infantry men would have been enough to arrest them all.

The gun at the Torel still had 26 grenades when it received order to stop, as there had been an armistice. Then there was order to withdraw to Rossio and, next, another order to withdraw to Queluz. They wanted to give it a Republican flag as had been given to the other units, but Couceiro refused and withdrew, passing through the middle of the people, who dared do nothing but cheer. They arrived at Queluz, fed and gave drink to the cattle which had not drunk or eaten for 30 hours, and went on to Sintra to present themselves to the King, who had already embarked."

Source: Letter from José Lobo to the Marquis of Lavradio, dated 26th of October, 1910, and written in Guarda.

17. "We are in a regime of *absolute republicanism* perfectly intransigent and inquisitorial. Not only is there no King, there is also no law.

The law has been substituted by the omnipotent will of the Emperor Afonso Costa. There is an official inquiry, so they say, in which rumours of violation of mail destined to suspect people, are arisen.

All 'clean' people are subject to the violent ways of the republicans. All caution is necessary to avoid persecutions and embarrassments.

Not only the civil class, but the military are absolutely undisciplined. The newspapers conceal the facts that are nevertheless of public control.

In Setúbal, two soldiers and one corporal arrested their colonel, whom they are going to present to the republican 'committee', who absolve him after suitable declarations to have the indignity to return, unauthorised, to the regiment.

In Portalegre, the commander of 22, despite saluting the republic, is threatened and persecuted, for the fact of having once punished the soldiers, and is forced to run to save his life.

The Order of the Army places in the No. 16 Infantry two officers and the soldiers put them on the streets, not consenting them to serve in the regiment. The same corps and the No. 1 Artillery refused to eat the food, declaring that they did not create the republic *to continue to be treated as dogs* and, if they do not want it, they, who made the revolution, will make it again! They want to be treated in their quality of heroes, and want higher wages.

In the streets, the soldiers do not salute the officers any more, and frequently jeer at them: a group of scoundrels, who had been expelled from the army due to moral incapacity, are proclaiming themselves as heroes, and have promotions from soldier to first sergeant, and from sergeant to lieutenant.

The provisional government, for its part, to satisfy the rabble, persecutes the civil servants, firing them from their jobs, and replacing them with the followers, without worrying with the fact that the former are reduced to poverty and therefore also to hunger. The infamous traitor Teixeira de Sousa is met at the station by the secretary of the omnipotent ministry, and is accompanied, for his perfect security, until Vidago.

The provisional government needs to have elections and show the powers that the ballot box speaks in its favour. For this intention, it needs the elements that accompanied Teixeira de Sousa and reproduce, correctly and larger in number, the acts of violence that he practised. As the guarantees are suspended, it is evident that the people, unarmed, cannot react against the armed forces. The dictator will have a large majority, or, actually, the totality of the candidatures, as no one will dare to react.

From one side of the country to the other, although there is a monarchic spirit in everyone's heart, not one protest is heard, and there is no manifestation of reaction. Almost everyone has joined the new regime. Rarely, the adherences are sincere, and even rarer are those that do not join. Nobody dares to react with the absolute conviction that such a reaction, at this time, would be completely useless. Time is necessary to discredit the republicans.

Financial exploration now starts: a people's subscriptions being organised with the excuse of extinguishing the national deficit. A begging group, in Lisbon, gained, in a single day . . . 3 contos de reis.

(. . .) Everything is lost for the Monarchy! Let there be no illusions on this question. The republic is also untenable and especially as there is already brewing a hateful situation in all the superior classes."

Source: Letter from Tavares de Proença to the Marquis of Lavradio dated 1911.

18. "On one of the first few months of 1911, Afonso XIII went to England, disembarking at Dover and going to London by automobile, accompanied by the Marquis of Viana. He took a little detour, going first to Abercorn to visit the Queen, D. Amélia, and the King, D. Manuel, a gesture that everyone thought to be highly praiseworthy. After 2 or 3 days, the King said to me — "Do you know what the King of Spain came to England for?"
 "Naturally for a distraction, and to play polo." — I replied.
 "He came to ask the English government not to oppose his entry into Portugal, as it did not suit him to have an anarchic Republic for a neighbour!"
 It was not the first time that the neighbour King looked futilely towards the English government, hoping to obtain their consent on the intervention question into Portugal. On the 10th of June, 1915, His Majesty wrote to me saying "We escaped a foreign intervention by the skin of our teeth. Spain wanted it; England stopped it."
 Source: "*Memórias do Sexto Marques de Lavradio*", page 185.
27. "Of the King's spirit, and of what H. M. thinks and believes of the *anti-republican* movement in which I am involved, there comes to me news which is not to my liking. I am, I believe, and pardon me for talking about myself, clear and direct in my words and actions, and, nevertheless, I see them disfigured — worse than that — I see the disfigurement encountering echoes perhaps by strength and extensions superior to those that my pretensions thought possible.
 It is too bad. But I am sorry that it must be like this.
 And, with the relationship of true caring that bind me to the person of the King, it is difficult for me, in reality that these thoughts and beliefs to which I am referring, are judged in his mind — without objections from my part.
- So I come to ask you (. . . in my name, the favour of submitting these objections to the King, which my voice, if it were there, would be perhaps able to specify, so as to deny him the intentions and concepts, of whose bases — with all due respect — I am permitted to doubt."
 Source: Letter from Henrique de Paiva Couceiro to the Marquis of Lavradio, dated 3rd of November, 1911.
28. "The Declaration', as you can well imagine, was to me a motive for disgust, for various reasons.
 When I wrote to you, I only suspected the existence of a bad atmosphere, aggravated with what has passed here with the Prince. A question of smoke, that the pure truth would soon disperse . . . I suspected, and I repeat, that all was smoke that I would be consciously able to clarify. But, above the smoke, there appeared the *fact* of the Declaration, and this is more serious. However, let us see how we shall get out of this one. (. . .) I sent a letter to the King, whose answer I now await. You can also well guess how I long to reach a satisfactory solution, although, personally, I would be ready to leave, this post, with the greatest pleasure.
 (. . .) Our business, despite the disturbance that the 'Declaration' was bound to bring, is proceeding with regularity, and a motive of hope. And we hope that this time the preparations will give us the effectiveness that we did not reach with the first incursion."
 Source: Letter from Henrique de Paiva Couceiro to the Marquis of Lavradio, dated 30th of November, 1911.

30. "From the negotiations entabulated by Couceiro, it was agreed that D. Miguel would recognise the right of succession of the D. Miguel branch of the family, when there were no more direct descendants.
 The King sent Couceiro a copy of the letter to D. Miguel and this Prince, by his turn, sent a copy of the letter he would send to the King. The two princes met at Dover, D. Miguel being accompanied by the viscount of S. João da Pesqueira. The interview was extremely cordial, the two princes having lunched together, and exchanged the letters *protocolly closed*.
 The interview finished, D. Miguel embarked for the continent, and the King went on to London; on the train, he opened the letter and . . . to his great amazement, he saw that letter was not at all what had been agreed! As soon as he got to Richmond, he sent it to Couceiro, who replied: "For me, there exists only one letter, the one that D. Miguel promised to write."
 Some state that it was D. Miguel's sons who did not agree to the conditions, and that D. Jaime had said that D. Miguel should represent only absolutism; others said that D. Miguel's advisors had been the viscount of S. João da Pesqueira and Alexandre Saldanha and that they had succeeded in convincing the prince to write another letter. What is a fact, is that the *pact of Dover* did not exist."
 Source: *Memórias do Sexto Marques de Lavradio*, page 219.