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SIR FRANCIS DRAKE AND THE "POOR KING" D. ANTONIO: THE PORTUGAL VOYAGE OF 1589

"And if the late Queen would have believed
her men of war, as she did her scribes, we had
in her time beaten that great empire to pieces
and made their king king of figs and oranges
as in old times. But Her Majesty did all by half
and by petty invasions taught the Spaniards how
to defend himself to see his own weakness which
till we taught him was hardly known to himself."

Walter Raleigh, cit. in Edward Edwards, *The Life of Sir Walter Raleigh,* II (London, 1868), p. 273.

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Introduction

In January, 1589, five months after the defeat of the "Invincible" Armada and at the height of his popularity, Sir Francis Drake complained of a "*...stain I took in quenching the fire... and not withstanding I have and do use all possible good means by physic following the advice of Doctor Fraunch, I do yet find little ease, for that my pain,... is fallen now into my legs and maketh me very unable to stand without much grief*".[1] In spite of the state of his health, the famous privateer, invariably considered as "*the master of the seas*",[2] or simply "*one of*

[1] Drake to Sir Julius Caesar, January 1589, in George Thomson, *Sir Francis Drake* (London, 1972), 324-25.

[2] Gradenigo, 10 de Janeiro de 1586, in Horatio Brown (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts relating to English affairs... in the Archives and Collections of Venice and... Northern*

Fig. 1 - Sir Francis Drake (c. 1542-1596), most famous of Elizabethan sea-dogs, was seen by many as responsible for the English counter-Armada failure. Elizabeth acused him of irresponsibility. (National Maritime Museum, Greenwich)

the cleverest thieves of the seas" [3] prepared to lead an English "counter-Armada", with an army commanded by Sir John Norris, sailing in May for the Iberian Peninsular on the galleon in which he had defeated the Spanish Armada - appropriately named *"Revenge"*.

In the same month, while waiting in England for the arrival of troops and ships promised by the United Provinces and recruiting intensively in the English Counties, the Ambassador Extraordinary of Mulay - Ahmed el Mansur Sheriff of Morocco, guaranteed in London to support the Queen and the Portuguese Pretender D. Antonio, Prior do Crato, *"todos fazerem liga"* [4] against Felipe II. But the wager in Lisbon proved too high. Elizabeth I remained at the mercy of Felipe II's stubborn navy, while Drake fell into disgrace and was banished from the seas he had terrorised, because he had upset the organisation of the largest military and naval expedition of the 16th Century, wasting an unique opportunity to annihilate the Spanish navy. It would also be the last attempt by D. Antonio to re-conquer the kingdom of Portugal from the Hapsburgs. Despite impressive means, neither side was able to obtain a clear victory. It is perhaps due to this that the historic details of his intervention in Portugal continue, to this day, to be unclear.[5]

The documentation presented here constitutes part of a detailed study of the campaign and its relationship to the war between Spain and England.

The Anglo-Spanish War

From the unofficial beginning of the war with Spain, in 1585, with the financial help and the dispatch of the English expeditionary force under the command of the Earl of Leicester, the United Provinces, under the Treaty of Nonesuch (August 20th) to contain the successive victorious campaigns of the Spanish army in Flanders led by Alexander Farnesio, Duke of Parma and

Italy, VIII (London, 1894), n. 304, cit. In Ludwig von Pastor, *Histoire des Papes,* XXI: Sixte-Quint (trans.: Paris, 1961), 443. n. 6.

[3] Dr. Alonso Criado de Castilla to Philip II, Panama, 17 April 1579, in Jorge Calvar Gross, *et al.* (eds), *La Batalha del Mar Oceano: Corpus Documental de las hostilidades entre España e Inglaterra (1568-1604),* I (Madrid, 1988), Doc. 118.

[4] Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa, microfilme R 6-3-3. "Tre(s)lado do papel de Gaspar da Gram" (1589), *"The substance of the Emperor of Morocco's message..."*, in R.B. Wernham (ed.), *The Expedition of Sir John Norris and Sir Francis Drake to Spain and Portugal in 1589* (Aldershot, 1988), Doc. 66.

[5] O melhor estudo português continua a ser de Durval Pires de Lima, *"O Ataque dos Ingleses a Lisboa em 1589 contado por uma testamunha"*, separata de *Lisboa e seu Termo. Estudos e Documentos,* I (Lisboa, 1948).

Fig. 2 - D. António, Prior do Crato (c. 1531-1595), born illegitimate and sworn King of Portugal, he was one of Philip II's worst thorns in his Empire and great friend of Leicester and Drake, supporters of his last attempt to win back the Portuguese throne.

Governor-General of the Low Countries - especially after the surrender of Brussels on March 10th and of Antwerp on March 17th - Drake became the spearhead of the English maritime offensive.

In reply to Felipe II's embargo of English shipping in Iberian ports (June and July) [6] the Spanish centres of commerce in the Caribbean (Cartagena of the Indies, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo etc.) were devastated under his command between September 1585 and June 1586 - causing a delay in the departure of the silver fleet and in turn impeding the preparation of the Spanish Armada.[7] Also in November 1585 and April of the following year, Leicester, recently appointed Governor of the United Provinces, published two decrees prohibiting trade with the Spanish "enemy".[8]

Felipe II reacted with the reorganisation of the project to invade England, signed in 1587, in a secret treaty with the Holy Sé (July 29th) immediately after

[6]José Luis Casado Soto, *Los Barcos Españoles del Siglo XVI y la Gran Armada de 1588* (Madrid, 1988), 52.

[7]Ver Mary Frear Keeler (ed.), *Sir Francis Drake's West Indian Voyage, 1585-86* (London, 1975).

[8]F.G. Oosterhoff, *Leicester and the Netherlands, 1586-1587* (Utrecht, 1988), 61 e 85.

the execution of Mary Stuart, the potential Catholic successor to Elizabeth I. In the same year Drake destroyed or captured about 24 ships in the Bay of Cadiz, once again delaying the departure of the Spanish Armada, harassed shipping off the Portuguese coast and landed at Sagres, occupying the fortress of Cape São Vicente and destroying the palaces of Infante D. Henrique - the Navigator - and the Convent of Cape São Vicente. After an unsuccessful attempt to land in Cascais, he sailed for the Açores where he captured the most valuable prize of the war - the royal ship *"São Filipe"* returning from Portuguese India. The efficiency of the English navy - recently formed under the tutelage of that other famous privateer, Sir John Hawkins, was due to a small but highly competent administrative body formed of, and run by, experienced mariners. On the other hand, technical improvement created the basis for a future maritime supremacy in a pioneering phase of clear experimental commercial expansion on the part of the rising maritime population in southern England, benefiting from numerous private initiatives supported - in part - by the Queen and her Privy Council.[9]

In the meantime England remained practically alone in her fight against Spain, even after the defeat of the Armada. Her potential allies were neutralised by Felipe II with the conquest of Portugal in 1580 and the completion of a Holy Union with the French Catholic League, through the Treaty of Joinville in 1584[10] which aimed to oppose the succession to the throne of the Protestant leader, Henrique de Navarre. Despite the fact that this alliance was largely discredited by the defeat of the Spanish Armada and the assassination of the leaders of the ultra-catholic leaders of the League, the fact is that, in April 1589, Henrique de Navarre was subsequently recognised as the heir to the throne of Henry III resulting in the renewal of the Civil War. Finally, in that month, the surrender of St. Geertruidenberg by the rebellious English garrison marked the end of the Spanish advance in the Low Countries. By September the first of a long series of mutinies occurred to cripple the Spanish army in Flanders until 1607 forcing the Duke of Parma, a few months later, to send Felipe II a proposal for peace with the United Provinces and to consider his own dismissal,[11] but the internal political struggles prevented the rebel Dutch to take advantage of the situation.

[9]Pastor, *op. Cit.*, 450-51 e 422-23; Penry Williams, *The Later Tudors. 1547-1603* (Oxford, 1995), 526 e 528.

[10]Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629* (Cambridge, 1995), 121-122.

[11]Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch Revolt* (reprint: London, 1990), 222, 226; Holt, *op. cit.*, 132. Farnésio era ainda (injustamente) co-responsabilizado pelo desastre da "Invencivel" Armada.

The Reply to the Spanish Armada

The origin of the 1589 campaign is to be found in Felipe II's plans to invade England. Although the idea was not a new one, proposals for offensive action on the Spanish coast were constantly postponed by the Queen, for diplomatic reasons. Indeed the great fear of the "Invincible" Armada and the summer of 1588 were enough to dispel the last hopes of an agreement with Spain[12] and for the Queen and some of her advisors to be convinced that to dispatch a "counter-Armada" would be desirable - naming Drake and Norris respectively as commanders of the squadron and the army.

Realising it was impossible to repair and re-equip the ships that had fought against the Armada in time to intercept the "silver fleet" and as an efficient blockade of Spanish navigation in the Atlantic was impracticable - *a blue water strategy* by Hawkins was confronted with logistical difficulties that required a base of operations (this showed the advantage of taking Lisbon and the Açores in 1589) and implied the weakening of the naval protection of the English coasts - only a direct attack of the enemy littoral coast remained. In the last months of 1588 more than two thirds of the Spanish Armada returned to Iberian ports[13] to be repaired and the losses of the warships - Portuguese and Castilian galleons - were minimal. In November rumours of the preparation of a new fleet reached England. It was now possible to turn the English advantage into a finishing stroke.

In spite of the apologists of intensification of the war in the Low Countries the opinion of Colonel Williams prevailed: *"The southern journey is the surest and most profitablest.. It is far better to hazard wars against raw rich people unfortified, than against expert soldiers, strong towns, where nothing is gotten but blows without true valour, great conduct, and infinite expenses"*[14] This opinion was based on long experience of war in the Low Countries where the English had obtained little, or no, progress against the Spanish since 1585. Now that England was at war and under threat of a new invasion the military leaders acquired a new importance, whose competence was indispensable, but the final decision laid with the Queen. The original objectives attributed to Norris and Drake at the end of September 1588 were: *"1. Attempt to burn the ships in Lisbon and Seville; 2. To take Lisbon; 3. To take the Islands (Açores)"*,[15] counting on a landing force to take control of Lisbon and re-establish the Prior do Crato, bastard grandson King Manuel I, on the throne that had been claimed since the death of D. Sebastião in Africa (1578). However, a month later, the Queen altered the course of the first objective to Santander and San Sebastian where it had been learnt, the bulk of the Spanish Armada had arrived, creating a fatal antagonism with the investors as to the priorities of the expedition.

The possibility of the English support of D. Antonio had been present since the eve of the invasion of Portugal.[16] However, the following year the Queen rejected Drake's plan to re-establish D. Antonio in the Açores, in spite of the opposition of free access to West Africa and the Far East, preferring to support the resistance of Ilha Terceira against Felipe II and to hold back from joining the French fleet led by Strozzi the following year, to organise more lucrative expeditions to the Gulf of Guiné. These opportunities were wasted by the limited means of the Royal Treasury, Spanish intimidation and negative opinions of the non-interventionist advisors and the community of merchants trading in Spain and its Empire.[17]

The English privateering grew under the Portuguese flag of convenience,[18] and Hawkins proposed a formal agreement with the Prior do Crato for a systematic blockade of Spanish navigation in the Atlantic; but the plan that was now proposed assumed greater dimensions in support of the Portuguese Pretender, with a more enduring objective than a simple punitive expedition. With D. Antonio in Portugal England would gain an ally at the gates of Spain - pressuring peace negotiations or creating a new fighting front against Felipe II - and the occupation of one or more islands in the Açores would provide a base necessary for the attack of the "silver fleet" that nourished the power of Spain, as Hawkins proposed.: *"Do not think to have any quietness with the King of Spain as long as his money comes out of the Indies"*.[19]

In the meantime the support of the United Provinces and the preparations of the defence against the Spanish Armada had depleted the Royal Treasury. The

[12]Para a importância da manutenção dos contactos diplomáticos de Farnésio e Felipe II com Isabel I desde o eclodir da guerra em 1585, veja-se, por ex., Penry Williams, *op. cit.*, 317-319. E von Pastor, *op. cit.*, 446.

[13]92 navios, segundo Casado Soto, *op. cit.*, 245.

[14]Sir Roger Williams, *"Discourse of the present wars in the Low Countries, Portugal, etc."*, 6/16 March 1589. In Wernham, Doc. 78.

[15] *"Notes of the charge of Sir John Norris journey..."* 20/30 September 1589, in Wernham, Doc. 10.

[16]Veja-se, por ex., Ralph Lane to Burghley, 7 March 1580, in Strype, *Annals of the Reformation,* III (2nd edn; Oxford, 1824), 165; Pires de Lima, *op.cit.*, 174 e 229.

[17]G.V. Scammell, *"The English in the Atlantic Islands,* c. 1450-1650", in *Vice-Admirante A. Teixeira da Mota. In Memoriam,* I (Lisboa, 1987) 338-340; D.B. Quinn, *England and the Azores, 1582-83* (Lisboa 1979).

[18]Cf. *La Batalla del Mar Océano,* I, Docs. 240 e 244, de Outubro de 1581; ANTT. "Arquivo de D. António."

[19]Wallace T. MacCaffrey, *Elizabeth I: War and Politics* (Princeton, 1992), 82-83.

solution was to adopt the system of semi-private joint stock, used in Drake's expeditions, with the participation of private investors to supply the bulk of the navy, consisting of ships and armed transport vessels. The Queen contributed £20,000 and six warships, military equipment and stores, whereas London and other port cities provided another twenty.

The private investment would be liquidated by the capture of the fleet of the Indies in the Açores and the confirmation by the Prior do Crato to all members of the expeditionary force: *"free access to all the ports of my kingdom and dominions both in Portugal, in Africa and Asia and in Guinea"*, guaranteeing merchants the freedom to live and trade in his dominions without molestation by the Inquisition, in addition to the establishment in England a *"house of contraction of the spicery"* from Portuguese India and the payment of three months' wages to the troops ten days after disembarking.[20] The high costs soon forced Norris to appeal, in vain, to the Archbishop of Canterbury, for a general contribution from the clergy, and to the councillors of Queen Elizabeth I *"to enter into adventure with us for the better gracing of our journey"*. D. Antonio also tried his luck with the Italian Jews.[21]

In February the problems became worse and Norris was unable to prevent mutiny and the abandoning of the expedition by the veteran troops - 2,000 Wallonian soldiers - provoked *"by malicious practices, and most by our own countrymen"*.[22] The United Provinces finally provided a slim contingent of 950 men under the command of Colonel Meetkeerke, instead of 2000 soldiers and 600 horsemen, munitions and ships promised to Norris, due to a misunderstanding with the Queen. In April the two commanders wrote that *"the army has doubly increased by reason of the gentlemen offering to serve, whom we can by no means refuse to entertain"*,[23] but the audacity of Drake saved the situation by diverting to Plymouth a Dutch merchant fleet en route to Spain with safe-conducts signed by the Duke of Parma that caused a Portuguese crewman to complain to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris.[24] Drake wrote: *"God be praised!... They will stead us greatly, for that our men are more than our own proportion of shipping could transport"*.[25] According to his own account, there were gathered in Plymouth about 12,400 soldiers (115 companies organised in regiments for the first time in England)[26] and 4,100 sailors on 180 ships, including D. Antonio and his son, D. Manuel de Portugal, and various Portuguese supporters.[27] In the meantime poor weather conditions and logistical problems caused a delay of six weeks obliging the Queen to make extraordinary expenditures due to the accelerated consumption of stores.

The two expedition leaders were good examples of the new self-trained professionals. Drake learned his trade as a "private adventurer" - that is, a pirate - and from 1585 as an Admiral of the Queen, leading surprise attacks on a large scale that largely resembled piracy. This largest, and most important expedition would be "by the book". The doubts the Queen had of his behaviour on this mission were expressed by her rigid instructions and by sending *"one trusty servant of her own"* Anthony Ashley, clerk of the Privy Council for *"observation of their actions... and to assist them also with good counsel and advice"* and *"keep a true journal in writing of all public actions and proceedings in way of counsel or in fact"*.[28] Drake also had to divulge and share all his decisions with Ashley.

Norris was certainly the most experienced English captain - he fought in France under Admiral Coligny, in Ireland - where, in 1575, he joined Drake in the massacre of the Scottish colony on the Isle of Rathlin - and in the Low Countries, where he commanded an English expeditionary force under the command of the Earl of Leicester in 1585 (the year the Armada was in Tilbury with Leicester).

Assault at La Coruña

The expedition finally left on April 28th - but had a bad start. During the short crossing 25 of the captured Dutch ships deserted with 2000 men aboard. On the morning of May 4th, Drake entered the Bay of La Coruña where, in spite of the promising information indicating the presence of 200 ships in this and neighbouring ports,[29] he found only four which were captured with the exception of the Portuguese galleon *San Juan de Portugal*, Admiral's flagship of the

[20] D.António to Burghley, London 23 October/2 Nov. 1588, in Wernham, Doc.25; Wernham, Doc. 72.

[21] Norris to Walsingham, 16 October 1589, inWernham, Doc 19; AGS, *Estado Francia,* K. 1570, doc. 143.

[22] *"Certain causes...,"* February, 1589, in Wernham, Doc. 75.

[23] Norris and Drake to the Privy Council, 3/13 April 1589, in Werham, Doc.88.

[24] Archivo General de Simancas, *Estado Francia,* K. 1570, doc. 153, D. Bernardino de Mendonza a Filipe II, Paris, 22 de Maio 1589; Drake (to Walsingham?), (3? April, 1589), in Werham. Doc. 89.

[25] Drake to Walsingham, 20/30 March 1589, in Werham, Doc. 85.

[26] A.L. Rowse, *The Expansion of Elizabethan England* (reprint: London, 1981), 284.

[27] Werham, *op.cit.*, Appendix II; P. José de Castro, *O Prior do Crato* (Lisboa, 1942), p.

[28] Burghley to Anthony Ashley, 4/14 March 1589, in Wernham, Doc. 77.

[29] *Calendar of State Papers: Domestic,* 2 (1581-90), ccxxiii, 64.

"Invincible" Armada whose captain, D. Martin de Bertendona, was forced to burn his ship the following day.

Bertendona, one of Felipe II's most capable seamen certainly remembered this episode when, two years later, he sank the *"Revenge"* in the Açores - the same ship which caused his humiliation. Norris landed easily with about 5000 men about a league from La Coruña but only managed to take a part of the lower city - the "Pescaderia" - the next day under heavy rain with a combined attack by land and sea. The two galleys of the port - the only operational Spanish warships - took advantage of the situation to escape and, at 9 o'clock at night, the English troops made a fresh landing again at the "Pescaderia" where they installed the Prior do Crato and his son.[30]

The city did not offer great resistance, it was vulnerable because many of the men had been inducted into the second "Invincible" Armada and the reception of the sick and the repairs to the surviving ships[31] made an ineffective defence of the Spanish coast: [32]*"no havia municiones para el sustento de la gente do guerra y mas cercados"*. While the people fled from the upper part of the town, the Marquês de Cerralbo - Governor of Galiza - ordered them to take from the abandoned houses *"el vino y pan y otros mantenimientos"* as well as all the artillery distributed for the defence of the city walls. The following day the various forces were re-grouped by the Archbishop of Santiago de Compostela and the Counts of Altamira and Andrade. Their role, and that of the arcabuziers, infantry and cavalry were, above all as *"jente de la tierra"* and the poorly armed 130 students of Santiago *"moços bien dispuestos"*, was insignificant returning after a few skirmishes with the English.[33] The Archbishop, fearing the worst, tried to prevent the sacking of the city and the cathedral by Drake *"Santo cuerpo del Apostol* (Santiago), *por nuestros peccados, no sea profanado de estos barbaros hereges"*.[34]

On May 16th Norris, at the head of 7000 Englishmen defeated, in open battle, the 8000 men of the main contingent of the reinforcement organised in the meantime by the Conde de Andrade, entrenched five miles from the city at El

[30] Maria del Carmen Saavedra Vázquez, *La Coruña durante el Reinado de Felipe II* (A Coruña, 1989) 214-17; Andrés Martinez Salazar, *El Cerco de La Coruña en 1589* (La Coruña, 1889), 71

[31] Maria del Carmen Saavedra Vázquez, *Maria Pita y la defensa de La Coruña in 1589* (La Coruña, 1989, 65.

[32] Cinco anos antes a fortaleza estava abandonada, sem artilharia, e o alcaide ausente. Cf. Cristóbal Vázquez de Escobar a Felipe II, in *La Batalla del Mar Océano*, I, Doc. 451.

[33] Cerralbo a Felipe II e *"Relación"* do arcebispo de Santiago, in Martinez Salazar, *op. cit.*, 69 e 73-75.

[34] Arcebispo de Santiago a Felipe II, *Ibid*, 78.

Burgo. The conquest of the walled high city was made impossible by the lack of artillery and by the inexperience of the English in siege warfare. [35] After an accident to the English troops caused by the detonation of a mine beneath one of the enclosed towers they withdrew. The city defence was reinforced by the women who, day and night, dug and carried earth and other materials to strengthen the walls, and stones to throw *"encima de la cabeza de los enemigos"*. Among these women was Maria Pita who personified the Spanish resistance and, until today, remains a mythical heroine who helped ward off the attack by the English.[36] The discipline of Norris' troops - consisting mainly of inexperienced recruits - proved a difficult task. On discovering local wine shops they became so drunk that they had to withdraw (the same situation happened in Portugal). Epidemics also caused the first deaths and weakened the troops.

During their time in La Coruña the military leaders wrote to the Queen confirming the presence of more ships at Santander but adding that the poor winds and absence of a safe landing place justified the delay and insisted that they were not able to destroy the ships in port without taking the neighbouring towns and promised, contradictorily, to fulfil this task on their return. For this reason they asked for more artillery, supplies and soldiers to join the fleet off the Iberian coast. In actual fact they were informing the Queen of their failure to carry out the first part of their mission with the means she had provided.[37] These requests were refused in a long, disapproving letter - the first of many - received as they prepared to leave for Lisbon which accused them of *"wholly neglecting your duty towards us so far as we cannot see how you will answer for the same"*, and demanding the immediate return of the Earl of Essex - her favourite who had left the Court - and intimating that they should follow the instructions of the Lord High Admiral[38] from then on. Essex had joined in the campaign most probably with the approval of its commanders because his influence at the Court had been used in favour of the expedition bringing military glory and settling his debts. On the eve of the departure Norris sent 6000 men to pillage the surroundings, stealing supplies and cattle, burning

[35] Drake to Burghley, Coruña, 8/18 May 1589, in Wernham, Doc. 114.

[36] *"Memorial de La Coruña"*, in Martinez Salazar, *op. cit.*, 80-81; Saavedra Vázquez, *op. cit., passim.*

[37] *"The want of the artillery that we demanded from Her Majesty is the cause that we have not taken this town. And the like want we shall feel of it in every place where we come, to the extreme hindrance of the service. But we feel the smart that Her Majesty was not pleased to believe us that had the charge of the voyage, but other partial humours"*. CF. Norris to Lord Burghley, Coruña, 8/18 May 1589, in Wernham, Doc. 113.

[38] The Queen to Norris and Drake, 20/30 May 1589, in Werham, Doc. 123.

houses and the monastery of Nuestre Señora de Cambre leaving the land *"de manera que en... dos años... no se puede coger fruto"*.[39]

The English re-embarked on May 7th with 80 prisoners and 150 pieces of captured artillery leaving the lower city *"ardiendo hasta los cimientos"*, including a monastery, three parochial churches and two hospitals and *"ultrajando las imagines de Dios Nuestro Señor y de su bendita Madre y sus sanctos, cortando a los sanctos crucifixos los braços y pescueços y ahorcando algunas imagines y deshaziéndoles los rostros"* and the inhabitants of the city and surrounding area *"en suma pobreza y miseria... por haver robado... sus haziendas y quemado y destruido sus casas"*.[40] This religious violence contributed in part to the failure of the campaign. The letter sent by the commanders had also stated that the principal Spanish preparations for a new Armada were taking place in Lisbon (this proved to be false). It is evident that to both Norris and Drake their primary objective was the Portuguese capital. It is to be noted that in spite of Elizabeth I's instructions, when Essex fled the Court he sailed directly to the Portuguese coast.[41] The commanders thought that they had satisfied the Queen's wishes since, following her instructions, there had been some kind of an offensive against the Spanish ships and La Coruña was an important base of Spanish naval operations, apart from conveniently being en route to Lisbon. They now felt free to sail for Portugal although aware of time lost and the fact that warning of their arrival had already preceded them.

Why Peniche?

Off Cabo da Roca, with Essex and Colonel Williams already re-united aboard the *"Swiftsure"*, one of the Queen's galleons, accompanied by some of the captured ships, the captains decided *"because we understood that the King had placed strong garrisons in every landing place near Lisbon, to land at a place called Peniche, otherwise the Young Rock"*.[42] Peniche had already had alerts due to actions of English fleets. In 1587, when Drake's expedition returned to Cadiz and to Sagres, the Vice-Roy of Portugal sent Bernadino Ribeiro to Peniche to organise a local defence force[43] and again in the first half of 1595 was sent to Pederneira as Commander of the Frontier and Chief

[39] *"Memoria de La Coruña"*, in Martinez Salazar, *op. cit.*, 82.

[40] *Ibid.*, 82-83; *Advertisements from the Groyne*, 7/17 May 1589, in Wernham, Doc. 112.

[41] Wernham, *op. cit.*, xxxvi-xxxvii.

[42] Sir Edward Norris to Sir Thomas Heneage (early June 1589), in Wernham, Doc. 134.

[43] Marquês de Santa Cruz a Felipe II, Lisboa, 21 de Abril de 1587, in Enrique Herrera Oria (ed.) *Felipe II, el Marquês de Santa Cruz y la Empresa de Inglaterra...* (Madrid 1946), Doc. 7.

Captain, with many *"gente de pé e de cavalo"* to defend *"em espeçial peniche e toda a costa até Lisboa"* until the end of the summer. In April of the following year during Essex's expedition to Cadiz and Faro the governors of Lisbon sent Antonio Pereira to Peniche *"com hum terço de gente que el Rey lhe mandou fizesse neste Reino"*.[44]

Although it had been proposed to disembark in Oeiras,[45] Peniche was chosen to allow the Portuguese soldiers promised by D. Antonio to gather and join up with the English on their march to Lisbon. Felipe II knew where the landing was to take place a month before Drake's departure[46] and he had obtained very precise information concerning the number of ships and men through coded correspondence with the omnipresent spy "David" - in reality Manuel de Andrada - and Antonio de Viega who indicated Portugal, the Açores and the Indias as the main objectives.[47] Letters were sent from Felipe II to the Vice-Roy of Portugal, the Cardeal-Archduque Alberto de Austria, his nephew, and to the principal Portuguese cities, advising them to defend the coast and to recruit soldiers from their areas. In Madrid *"O Consejo de Guerra"* issued the same directives to Ceuta and Tangier and warned of English secret contacts with Morocco.[48] In Lisbon the War Council met with some of the most competent military men of the era - among whom the Conde de Fuentes *"capitan general del Reyno"* and the Marquês de Santa Cruz, general of the galleys, whose decisions on the defence of the capital were sent to the Cardeal-Archduque. Fuentes received notice from Cerralbo on May 18th of the withdrawal of the English from La Coruña at the time that the Portuguese colonels were arming the troops.[49] Little by little the entire coast of Portugal prepared to receive D. Antonio and the *"piratas hereges"*.

[44] M. Lopes de Almeida (ed.) *Memorial de Pero Roiz Soares, I,* (Coimbra, 1953), 309-10, 321-22.

[45] Anonymous, *A project to sack the city of Lisbon* (March or April 1589), Wernham, Doc.81.

[46] AGS, *Estado Francia,* K. 1569, doc. 4 "Avisos" de Inglaterra, por David, Março de 1589.

[47] *Calendar of State Papers: Spanish,* IV, 522-26, cit. in Wernham, *op. cit.*, xxxvi-xxxvii; AGC, *Estado Francia,* K. 1570, doc. 77, "Avisos" de Londres, 2 de Março 1589.

[48] AGS, GA, leg. 262, doc. 216, Madrid, 12 de Maio 1589. No entanto, Felipe II garantiu a neutralidade marroquina entregando a praça de Arzila ao Xerife de Fez (Marrocos), cf. David Lopes. *Historia de Arzila durante o Dominio Português* (Coimbra, 1925), 457-9.

[49] Bibl. da Academia das Ciências de Lisboa, *Série Vermelha,* 461, *"Relaçion de la venida de Don Antonio de Portugal prior de Ocrato con la Armada de la Reyna de Ynglaterra en el año de 1589..."* fls. 35, 27-27v.



Fig. 3 - Consolação beach, where, on the evening of 26th May, the English forces sucessfully landed with the Prior do Crato. At least 25 men died when their boat capsized Peniche fortress lies in the distance, just 1 mile ahead.

The Landing

On Friday, 26th May 1589 at 10:00 in the morning, the inhabitants of the peaceful town of Peniche, *"not hitherto...known but to very few Englishmen"*, *"a pretty town with a strong castle...which did shoot at us at our first coming in"*, [50] were surprised by an English squadron of 155 ships[51] manoeuvring offshore. Having been alerted some hours earlier by the watch vessels to seaward of the Berlengas, the Chief Magistrate, D. João Gonçalves de Ataide (4th Conde de Atouguia) - who was with D. Pedro de Guzmán, Inspector-General of the Troops of the Realm organising the water supply in the Peniche fort - sent various despatch vessels, including a *barca* with an emissary who was received a few hours later by the Cardeal-Archduque in Lisbon. The same night, the Chief Magistrate, D. Martinho Soares de Alarcão, left Torres Vedras with 12 companies and Gaspar de Alarcón, Captain of the Spanish Horse, leading 110 chargers from the coast of Granada, arriving in sight of Peniche close to midnight.[52]

[50] John Evesham, *"The voyage of Portugal..."* (July 1589?), in Wernham, Doc. 163.

[51] Norris and Drake to the Privy Council, 2/12 June 1589, in Wernham, Doc. 131.

[52] "Carta de André Falcão de Resende sobre a Vinda dos Ingleses", in *Miscelânea* (Coimbra, 1924), 1-9, Biiblioteca da Ajuda, 50-V-36, *"Apresto para a Defenção da Cidade de Lisboa Contra*

About 2 o'clock in the afternoon the English pilots sounded the shallows southward of the peninsular and the beach of the fortress. Two hours later, 50 ships with a vanguard of 2000 men led by Sir Roger Williams and Essex, headed for the beach of Nossa Senhora da Consolação. According to Captain Wingfield, the young Essex risked drowning to be the first to land, *"under the shot of the castle and above the waist in water, more than a mile from the town"*.

The Spanish infantry companies under the command of D. Pedro de Guzmán effected some losses on the English with fierce hand-to-hand fighting that lasted two hours before Norris and the rest of the force (including D. Antonio) could disembark, many considering *"a landing-place most unadvisedly chosen"*, [53] owing to the rocks which damaged several of the ships and the steep terrain which they had to climb. In spite of good weather, a strong surf overturned one of the barges drowning at least 25 men. The task was no easier for the Spanish because the beach was too large to be defended well and *"sendo aquella a apart em que, a parcer dos marinheiros dai, peor podiam desembarcar, aonde por essa resão se não esperava que o fisesem"*, and the defenders had been surprised on their own ground. Furthermore, an English witness confirmed that the Spanish were afraid of the English fleet's artillery even though they were out of range. That same night Essex and Norris entered the town abandoned by the Spanish army while the cavalry and the remaining troops continued to land under a full moon.

Despite the fact that Peniche was garrisoned by three companies of Spanish Infantry and two Portuguese companies,[54] many of the inhabitants fled in panic as soon as they heard of Drake's presence, amidst rumours of an enormous fleet with *"900 perros de ayuda Irlandeses armados y tan grandes y mas feroçes leones que se comerian a un mundo todo y ostras fabulas...que ponian terror a gente rustica e de poco discurso"*. Among them was the actual Magistrate, leaving Capitão Antonio de Araujo, a veteran of Portuguese India in the fort with only 50 soldiers and a few local inhabitants.

At the sight of the Prior do Crato coming ashore with an upraised cross and an emblem of the Virgin Mary accompanied by the English cannons, the Captain surrendered the fort despite the fact that it was well supplied with both artillery and munitions and was considered impregnable by the invaders. After D. Antonio allowed him to take goods left by the Castilians, Capitão Araujo

a Armada Ingleza em que veio o Prior do Crato em Maio de 1589", Biblioteca da Ajuda, 50--v-36.

[53] *"An advertisement to... the Lord High Treasurer of England"*, 15/25 Febr. 1589, in Wernham, Doc. 173.

[54] "Carta de André Falcão de Resende", BACL, *"Relaçion"*. Fls. 26-26v.

abandoned the town and the guns of the fort were taken on board the English fleet. Recognising the Portuguese Pretender in front of the troops the population returned and welcomed him *"como a Rey"*.[55] D. Antonio was lodged in the houses of the Magistrate, whose silver, ornaments and tapestries were confiscated along with those of D. Pero de Guzmão while his son distributed the captured arms and munitions to the Portuguese.

The reinforcements from Obidos, headed by D. Dinis de Lencastre, High Commander of the Order of Christ with *"pouco mais que seus criados; porque a gente lhe fugiu"*, arrived too late and, at the sight of the number of disembarking troops, fled back to their lands.[56] The next day was the turn of the contingents from Torres Vedras and Alcobaça *"gente rustica, e fraca"* to disband *"ja sem armas e sem animo"* in spite of the efforts of their officers to whom the Magistrate of Peniche affirmed that *"não havia que fazer"*.[57] Guzmán and the Magistrate of Torres Vedras met in the Coimbrã half a league from Peniche with Gaspar de Alarcón to whom a French prisoner *"que vinha com hum recado de Dom Antonio, pera hum Mosteiro de frades ahy vezinho"*,[58] revealed exaggerated numbers of the invaders: 20,000 men and 600 cavalry. Because of their doubts the Spanish retreated to a more distant position to observe the enemy movements, returning to Torres Vedras on the following day. The Magistrate of Peniche followed, incognito, to Lisbon to join the Cardeal-Archduque.

On the 27th the forces divided: Norris initiated a march to the capital to join the fleet and Drake, before leaving for Cascais[59] in a somewhat unusual gesture, *"stood upon the ascent of an hill... and with a pleasing kindness took his leave severally of the commanders of every regiment"*, promising to rejoin them in Lisbon.

The March to Lisbon

Leaving behind the ill and the injured with a company of 200 soldiers under Captain Barton and Antonio de Brito Pimentel to ensure a safe retreat, Norris initiated a punishing march with less than 6000 soldiers exhausted by the siege of La Coruña and diminished by illness, and 44 horsemen but no artillery. Essex

[55] BACL, *"Relaçion"*, fls. 31-31v. e 33v.
[56] "Carta de André Falcão de Resende".
[57] BA, *"Apresto"*; ANTT, *Corpo Cronológico,* Parte I, Maço 112, doc. 53.
[58] "Carta de André Falcão de Resende".
[59] *"A True Discourse..."*, Anthony Wingfield, 1589, in Wernham, Doc. 166.



Fig. 4 - Peniche fortress (first half of the 20th century), showing the beach (now disappeared) where the Spaniards believed Drake would land. D. António was newly sworn as King here. (Arquivo Histórico Militar, Lisboa)

and Colonel Williams commanded the vanguard while D. Antonio and his son brought up the rear with the cavalry. However, they left without D. Antonio being able to announce his return to the potential insurgents, causing difficulties with the indispensable Portuguese support. Under a scalding spring sun *"such as our natures are not able to endure it"* and unprovided with logistics, it took them six days to cover the 80 kms of mountainous terrain to Lisbon, carrying only munitions and individual supplies.[60] Stretchers had to be improvised and Essex had to share the few carts available with both luggage and the sick. The Spanish - throughout the campaign - avoided field battles, preferring constant skirmishes which were more effective in demoralising the enemy.

On the 28th D. Antonio and the English troops arrived at Lourinhã, while in Torres Vedras, given the absence of fortifications, Captains D. Sancho Bravo, recently arrived with five companies of cavalry and arquebusiers, D. Pedro de Guzmán and Gaspar de Alarcón decided to fall back to Enxara dos Cavaleiros, two leagues south on the way to Lisbon. Alarcón maintained some horses

[60] *"Advertisements from Cascais"*, in Wernham, Doc. 137, Roger Williams to Walsingham(?), Id., Doc. 129.

"sempre a vista do inimigo" and sent spies to *"todas partes"* to follow the English.[61] The following afternoon D. Antonio was presented with the keys of the town and entered Torres Vedras with the English vanguard. Francisco de Seixas, the man to whom the Spanish had entrusted the castle, surrendered it to the Prior do Crato, for the King, to whom the crowd swore allegiance, filing by underneath the palio as in Peniche, Lourinhã, Torres Vedras and other places en route. D. Antonio was lodged in the castle where he spent the night. In the meantime many friars, poor people and some noblemen gathered with the promise of more to come.

The followers of D. Antonio were virtually eliminated by exile, imprisonment, summary execution - overall of the clergy but also of noblemen, merchants, agents, or ordinary simple suspects of belonging to the cause of the Prior during the reign of Felipe II who had issued a decree prohibiting any public acclamations - apart from his own - under heavy penalty for those who did not comply.[62]

When D. Antonio disembarked at Peniche eight years had passed since he fled from Portugal and, since then, contestation against the Castilian rule by the sermons of priests, and the assassinations of Spanish soldiers, as well as the bloody episode of the King of Ericeira in 1585 making inevitable the violent repression of Felipe II in a manner that was dreaded more "*serem prezos por estes cazos que não pella santa Inquisição*".[63] As late as March of 1589 in the remote town of Penamacor *"havia pessoas da parcialidade de Dom Antonio"*, who were happy *"de não succeder bem a Armada* (de 1588)", considering words *"tam diffamatorias"* which one of the councillors, who did not want to identify the author, was punished by order of the Cardeal-Archduque.[64] At the beginning of the year, the King ordered *"setenta fidalgos portugueses que fuesen a Madrid y a otras partes de Castilla por sospechosos en la afición de don Antonio"*.[65] In the same way, the news of the landing provoked panic in Lisbon. In the early hours of the morning, the inhabitants abandoned the city in

[61]"Carta de André Falcão de Resende", fl. 34v.

[62]BA, 44-XIV-4, *Consultas do Desembargo do Paço,* Tomo II (1589-1592), Fl. 29v.

[63]João F. Marques, *A Parenética Portuguesa e a Dominação Filipina* (Porto 1986), 88-96; A. Freitas de Meneses, "Insegurança e revolta nas relações entre açorianos e soldados estrangeiros: 1580-1590", in *Revista de História das Ideias*, 6 (Coimbra, 1985); Isabel Ma. Ribeiro Mendes, "A defesa do Termo de Lisboa em 1594-95", in *Revista da Faculdade de Letras,* 12 (Lisboa, 1989), 97-115; *Memorial de Pero Roiz Soares,* 223-28, 289, etc.

[64]BA, 51-VI-30, *"Miscelânea"*, fl. 25v.

[65]BACL, *"Relaçion"*, fl. 19; veja-se, por ex. Filipe II a D. Bernardino de Mendoza, Lisboa 4 de Setembro de 1581, *La Batalla del Mar Océano*, I, Doc. 231; *Memorial de Pero Roiz Soares,* 146, 193, 228, 242 e 288-9.

any way they could, on foot, horseback, paying fortunes to rent carts and boats to leave for Barreiro or Aldeia Galega.

The lack of supplies in the English encampment worsened with Norris' orders banning stealing from the Portuguese which obliged the English to eat *"muitas imundicias...e muitos delles se embebedavão, por aver muito vinho na villa"* and many *"adoecião e morrião"*.[66] According to witnesses the English complained *"da sequidão de nossos manjares e se mostravão suadosos dos ares frios, e regalos de sua patria"*. On hearing the complaints from Colonel Williams, D. Antonio guaranteed provisions to be provided by Gaspar Campelo - a Lisbon judge of criminal law who resided on an estate near to Torres Vedras - on the understanding that the people would be compensated if Lisbon was taken. The next day, the English army passed through the small villages of São Sebastião, Enxara do Bispo and Enxara dos Cavaleiros located in the neighbouring Socorro mountains and camped that night in Loures. Fearing an attack from the eastern suburbs of Lisbon, Fuentes reinforced the garrison of the Campo de Santa Clara and sent the cavalry commanded by Captains Guzmán and Bravo early the next morning from their camp at Nossa Senhora da Luz to reconnoitre the English camp half a league from Santo Adrião and try to cut off its supplies. For two days the Spanish attacks caused many losses and made several prisoners, until they were forced to retreat owing to the strong defensive positions of the English. The information given to the Spanish about the precarious state of the enemy proved useful. The defenders, reinforced continually by soldiers and supplies by land and sea were limited to defending the capital, leaving the English at the mercy of their own weaknesses.

On the 31st the Spanish Camp moved to near the Alcantara bridge, in case Drake should sail up the Tagus river, while the Castilian women retreated to the Castle of São Jorge and to the São Julião fort, the nuns of the extra-mural convents from Esperança, Odivelas and Santo-o-Novo were gathered in Lisbon together with the inhabitants of the neighbouring farms. Their fear was so great that some nuns were admitted into their family homes and others created scandals fleeing to the cells and dormitories of the monks of S. Francisco, giving rise to malicious rumours, and upsetting divine services *"que devia al demonio pretenderio mui deveras para que quitadas estas defensas espirituales"* allowing heretics to advance their ideas.[67] Only in Xabregas were the Franciscan nuns of the Madre de Deus able to remain free of danger.

[66]"Carta de André Falcão de Resende".

[67]BACL, *"Relaçion"*, fl. 68v.

At this time Drake disembarked with 300 soldiers, among whom was the Portuguese pilot of the *"Revenge"* to guarantee support to the Prior do Crato in the bay in front of the Franciscan monastery of Santo Antonio in Estoril, out of range of the Cascais artillery, where they took on water and persuaded two old monks not to flee and to tell the hiding clergy that they would not be harmed. The next day the inhabitants of Cascais *"did sit in their doors when we marched by, bringing bread, water, and wine into the streets for our men"* received the 1500 men led by Drake under the strict orders not to molest the Portuguese. Cascais was, according to an English nobleman *"a most sweet town and cleanly kept; but when our soldiers had kept it one week, it was a place most loathsome"*.[68] The English lodged in the palace of the Condes de Castro - Cascais nobles - *"a house of the King's built like to the Exchange in London"*, where Felipe II had stayed eight years before during his visit to Portugal.[69] Only the castle garrison with abundant munitions and supplies continued to be hostile firing sporadically on the enemy camp which, at the beginning of the siege, consisted of 1000 men both soldiers and sailors.[70] That night notice was given of the arrival of Norris in the Lisbon suburbs.

Drake was approaching the most delicate part of his mission. In the Tagus was the same squadron of galleys, now led by his brother D. Alonso de Bazán, that the first Marquês de Santa Cruz - originator and planner of the "Invincible" Armada - used to impede his entry in 1587. The São Julião de Barra fortress had been substantially enlarged between 1582-1589 under the direction of Italian military engineers[71] and, at this time, contained an imposing cannon from Diu (today in the Museu de Exército)[72] 6 metres long and mounted on a special gun carriage capable of supporting its weight of 19.5 tonnes. At the entrance of the bar a wooden platform existed on the sands at Cabeça Seca, fitted with thirty pieces of artillery (near the fort of São Lourenço, at Cabeça Seca or the Bugio) providing crossfire with the batteries of São Julião, similar to the other constructed in 1580 against the squadron of the Marquês de Santa Cruz.

Meanwhile Fuentes ordered the army to enter the city to enable the best defence and to prevent the possible incitement of the Portuguese military who

[68]John Evesham, *"The Voyage of Portugal..."*, (July 1589?), in Wernham, Doc. 163.

[69]*Ibid.*; Gachard (ed.), *Lettres de Phillipe II à ses filles, les infantes Isabelle et Catherine, écrites pendant son voyage au Portugal, 1581-1583* (Paris,1884),118-119.

[70]Anthony Ashley to Walsingham, Cascais, 2/12 June 1589, in Wernham, Doc.132.

[71]Veja-se, por ex., Carlos Pereira Callixto, *São Julião da Barra. Os Primeiros 100 Anos* (Lisboa, 1989), 51-53 e 70; *La Batalla del Mar Océano*, I, Doc. 380, caps. 19 e 32 (23 de Junho de 1584); ANTT, Parte II, Maço 259, doc. 26 (25 de Maio de 1589).

[72]Para a sua história, veja-se, entre outros, David Lopes/Esteves Pereira, *A Peça de Diu* (Lisboa, 1892).

were suspected by their Castilian officers of having increased in numbers the previous night with an unexpected retreat of 500 soldiers to the capital. Outside the walls, in Pampulla, grain warehouses were burned and houses that were built against the walls of the Bairro Alta destroyed in preparation of the defence of Lisbon.

The Siege

On the morning of June 1st, the day of *"Corpo Deus"* the Spanish army withdrew into the city and the companies were deployed at improvised mustering points throughout Nossa Senhora de Graça, Terreiro de Paço and Rossio and along the *"Fernandina"* walls blocking the wicket gates with rubble. The foreign residents in the city formed three voluntary companies nominating their own captains and leaders. The Castilians offered to guard the Cardeal-Archduque and the Germans, Flemish and Italians served as arquebuziers in the Palácio de Ribeira.[73] The Portuguese cavalry patrolled the streets maintaining order in the city. The procession of the Sacred Sacraments did not take place as usual. That night Norris encamped at Alvalada where many of the English soldiers died through drinking contaminated water on their march. D. Antonio took advantage to visit the estate of *"Juan Luys"* - also known as Estevão Ferreira de Gama, an exiled supporter who was taking his wife back to England - with the result that his effigy was burnt by the Spaniards.[74]

In the afternoon after a reconnaissance led by Colonel Williams and Captain Wingfield to the abandoned areas, the troops occupied the buildings and entrenched between Moinhos de Vento (today the Rua de Escola Politécnica and Principe Real) and Santa Catarina to Esperança and Boa Vista, a hill easily defendable which dominated the city, taking advantage of the best lodgings in an area with many estates favoured by the noblemen. Norris established his headquarters at the Quinta dos Soares da Cotovia (in the Rua Escola Politécnica where the building of the Imprensa Nacional is today). From this high vantage point at Moinhos de Vento Norris realised the enormity of the task, admiring the *"comprido sitio da muralha de Lisboa e grandeza dos arrebaldes; e disse que não podia cercar a cidade, senão com 40 mil homens"*.[75] The English were fired upon from the Castelo de São Jorge on the opposite side of the valley but the volleys were generally ineffective and received with applause and derision by the invaders. One of the shots hit Norris' headquarters in Cotovia "spraying" D.

[73]BACL, *"Relaçion"*, fls. 53-53v.

[74]AGS, *Estado Francia*, K. 1569, doc. 69, Tours (?), 8 de Julho de 1589.

[75]BA, *"Apresto"*, fl. 3v.

Antonio with stones and lime convincing him to move away from danger to the house of Belchior de Carvalho, a notary of the Casa da India, in the Calçada de Combro.

In the abandoned quarters the English soldiers found sufficient spices, foodstuffs and jewels (to the value of 500,000 crowns in Boavista alone) making them, according to Captain Wingfield *"the richest army that ever went out of England. For besides the particular wealth of every house, there were many warehouses by the waterside full of all sorts of rich merchandises"*. If the soldiers had been allowed to pillage the areas, which did not happen because of the directive from D. Antonio, they would have encountered even more riches. During the night the houses lining the walls around the gates of Santa Catarina were burned. The silence and stillness of the English troops were noted by the Castilian spies but it was thought that they were waiting for the city uprising.

During the night the Spanish soldiers took up their positions on the walls and on the roofs of the churches of Loreto and São Roque staying awake for fear of the threat of the siege. In the meantime in the Monastery of São Lorenzo del Escorial inaugurated that year, Felipe II sent letters to the cities of Coimbra and Porto forewarning them against providing the enemy with supplies or reinforcements during the attack on Lisbon.

In the early morning of June 3rd the defenders set fire to the houses adjoining the walls of Santa Catarina and some of the buildings within the ramparts. Even without the promised rebellion and with only 200 Portuguese attached to D. Antonio, Norris launched an attack to take the Church of Loreto which protected the gates of Santa Catarina which effected an easy entrance to the city. In the morning, at low tide, the English attempted to descend the Bairro Alto to attack the most vulnerable part of the ramparts on the riverside by the sumptuous palace of Corte Reais (Corpo Santo) property of the controversial D. Cristovão de Mouro, protégé of Felipe II. The assault was foiled by, ironically, the small ship *"Maria San Juan"* the only survivor of the "Invincible" Armada to return to Lisbon.[76] The Basque crew were able to avenge the defeat of the previous year unleashing, together with the galleys, a barrage of gunfire. A little after midday, taking advantage of the arrival of 500 veteran soldiers from Porto, the Spanish attacked on two fronts: from the gates of Santo Antão emerged 500 arquebuziers and pike-men, followed by three companies of cavalry that climbed the hill of Annunciada to São Roque - along the walls - until the Quinta of André Soares, while Captain D. Fernando de Agreda led 200 marksmen over the walls and into the Church of Loreto where the English,

[76]Casado Soto, *op. cit.*, 248; AGS, *GA*, leg. 271, doc. 210 (20 de Novembro de 1589).

who had broken down the doors, were repelled by the musketeers firing from the rooftops, verandas and windows of São Roque. The battle around the Quinta da Cotovia caused more carnage involving hand-to-hand fighting after the Spanish crying *"Viva El Rey Dom Antonio"* confused the English who allowed them to advance.[77]

Leaving the trenches, the cavalry charged but the streets were narrow and they were caught by the English firing from the windows. The cavalry withdrew running down their own infantry. It was then necessary to reinforce the 200 arquebuziers and 50 pike-men to cover the retreat but the strength of the English counter-attack brought the fighting to the gates of Santa Catarina where Essex challenged the garrison to leave.

This was the last battle. Both sides suffered around 40 losses including various officers. The English buried one of their captains in Santa Catarina with full ceremony while the Spanish wounded were transferred to the Hospital of Todos-os- Santos. Two centuries after the siege by D. João I de Castela against another Portuguese Pretender, the medieval walls *"tão debilitados que a pode de apitos os tinhamos em pé"* proved capable of defending the city once again.[78] D. Antonio knew the place well; in March 1581 several of his supporters barely escaped the Spanish when negotiating with the Prior do Loreto for a boat in which to flee the country.[79] Once again Felipe II prevented Lisbon from receiving D. Antonio, *"this poor King, which without the same is utterly ruined"*.[80]

During the siege many Portuguese were captured causing popular indignation, one of these being the Conde de Redondo who escaped deportation and Luis Gonçalves Ferreira, Keeper of the Chamber of the Cardeal-Archduque. An Englishmen and a recently baptised Moroccan Moor were hanged for having fired at the Conde de Vila da Horta. An important Portuguese nobleman, D. Rui Dias Lobo, brother of the Barão de Alvito, was imprisoned in the Mosteiro da Trindade and denounced by the Trino superior for preparing for the English to enter by the portion of the wall adjacent to the building. He was beheaded on the same day at the Ribeira da Lisboa where his head was shown with a sign saying *"Traitor"*.

[77]*"Vinda de D. Antonio"*, in Maria Fernandes, *O Rei D. Antonio* (Coimbra, 1944), 260; Wernham, Doc. 137.

[78]José Alberto Loureiro dos Santos, *Abordagem Estratégica da Guerra de Independência* (Lisboa, 1986); Francisco Rodrigues Lobo Soropita, *"Carta do Autor a um amigo..."* in Pires de Lima, *op. cit.*, 310.

[79]*Colección de Documentos Inèditos para la Historia de España*, XXXIV (Madrid, 1859), 135.

[80]Ralph Lane, 2/12 June 1589, in Wernham, Doc. 135.

The situation became unsustainable for Norris owing to the failure of support from the population, without ammunition to continue the siege and with an epidemic raging through his army because of the lack of doctors. Still worse was Drake's failure to provide support. After conferring with his council of officers, the General broke camp late afternoon of June 4th and retreated silently between midnight and two in the morning leaving behind fires alight to confuse the besieged enemy.

Retreat To Cascais

The rearguard, with D. Manuel and the English cavalry left in the early morning of the fifth, arriving in Cascais the same night, while the disillusioned D. Antonio headed at a good pace for Alcantara, over the rough countryside away from the paths because Bazan's galleys fired upon them again and prevented him following the cavalry.

Fuentes, fearing an ambush, delayed the departure of the troops. The cavalry of Bravo and Alarcón, stationed near the chapel of Santo Amaro followed in the tracks of the English inflicting casualties on them. Meanwhile, in Lisbon, the entreaties of the Conde de Vila da Horta to be allowed to leave with the Portuguese cavalry and a few noblemen were ignored by Fuentes who held them ready in the Rossio without advising them of his own departure. The misunderstandings with Fuentes did not prevent the Portuguese Captain from joining in the chase after Norris and D. Antonio as far as Oeiras and arriving finally in Cascais late on 7th to find the enemy already dug in there and in the Monastery of São Antonio. He was only able to intercept the stragglers along the paths and on the farms. The next day, returning to Lisbon, Fuentes avoided yet another challenge to combat from Essex, stating that he could not engage him in battle unless ordered to do so by the King.

During the following days, the Spanish officers conferred in Lisbon to try to find the best way to destroy the English fleet, digging trenches along the most probable landing points and gathering reinforcements in the city. The Duke of Bragança, D. Teodósio, and his brother, along with 1000 foot soldiers and 200 horsemen, were the most welcomed and received by the Arquiduque at the palace. The English spent two days rounding up cattle from the countryside around Cascais, Colares and Sintra whose areas had declared for D. Antonio donating arms and three thousand ducats obtained from the coffers of the Orphans of Sintra.

The Magistrate, Francisco de Cardenas persuaded by his confessor - one of the priests from the Monastery in Estoril - invoking *"Pecado mortal defenderse sabiendo que no tenia remedio"* [81]finally totally surrendered the Castelo de Cascais on the 11th with its standard and baggage. Cardenas retreated to Setubal in a vessel that was made available by the English; he was captured there and subsequently beheaded at the Ribeira da Lisboa. Drake captured a fleet of 60 Hanseatic ships carrying grain and supplies en route to Lisbon but the cargo became worthless as the Portuguese cavalry had destroyed the millstones of Oeiras and Barcarena.

Some few days previously, writing to Walshingham from Cascais aboard the *"Revenge"*, the corsair-admiral told of his dismay *"the best I can write is that I perfectly believe the enemy will not trouble England suddenly"* echoing the unanimous opinion that the attack on La Coruña was the principal cause of the lack of success.

Without hopes of reinforcements of the English and Moroccan contingents, Drake and Norris decided, once again, not to attack Lisbon and started the re-embarcation on the 13th with 8500 survivors of which 2800 were considered too ill to be of any use. Near to 4000 men had been lost in three weeks since the landing in La Coruña and the retreat to Cascais for reasons of desertion, illness and combat.

In the meantime, the ships which had been sent to fetch the garrison left behind in Peniche encountered Spanish artillery and discovered that Captain Barton had already departed for England abandoning more than 300 men, among whom was Antonio de Brito Pimentel who the Spanish captured after taking Torres Vedras which had remained loyal to D. Antonio.

Drake sailed from Cascais on Sunday 18th and, after sacking the town, setting fire to the castle and taking on board their artillery, set course for Cape São Vicente. Two days later the fleet was becalmed off Cabo Espichel alerting, by its presence, the Duque de Aveiro to prepare to defend Setubal. At nine in the morning the 15 galleys of the primate of Castile, General of the Spanish Galleys, intercepted the five slowest ships, sinking three and setting fire to two more with incendiary bombs, and after a three hour battle captured several of the English.[82]

On June 23rd, the fleet left the Portuguese coast. On the return journey the commanders disembarked in Vigo, Galiza, with 2000 men who then sacked and burned the town. The expected attack on the Açores by part of Drake's fleet was not carried out due to bad weather, while the rest of the fleet, under Norris,

[81]BACL, *"Relaçion"*, fl. 81.

[82]Wernham, Docs. 131 e 165; AGS, *GA*. Leg. 262, doc. 36; BA, "Apresto", fl. 4; Wernham, Docs. 131 e 165.

returned to England. A month later the Master of the Field and Governor of the Açores, Juan de Urbina, informed Felipe II that *"se esta con cuydado"* his defence was being readied in the absence of news of the English fleet and that the local magistrate was determining which of the inhabitants of the islands dared to speak *"licençiosamente"* about the arrival of D. Antonio on the mainland. A week later the last objective of the expedition i.e. the East India ships, anchored in the Bay of Angra where they were well-protected awaiting to depart for Lisbon. [83]

Meanwhile, the storms had caused much damage to Drake's fleet and each Captain had to make way as he could, some arriving at unexpected destinations. After the battle with the galleys, Captain Fenner's ship was blown off course by the storm and, in need of replenishing his water supply, set sail for Madeira. There he captured a ship with supplies and, days later with 16 other ships that had joined him, took possession of the island *"where we refreshed ourselves... and after ransomed the town"* where hunger obliged them to demand a ransom of fruit, livestock, wine and water.[84] Drake arrived in Plymouth, before Norris, on July10th, with D. Antonio and at least 30 Portuguese survivors.[85]

The losses were heavy, Henry Gayney, captain of the *"Griffin"* wrote that after the landing in Vigo during the return journey, *"there... was not in the ship five or six men that was well. The master died since the ship's return and of 50 soldiers... they hurled overboard a 32 or 33"*. On July 25th Norris communicated to Walsingham his desire to leave Plymouth, which he described an *"infected place"*, after the return of the expeditionary force. With the arrival of the bad news, the Queen, in similar terms to Felipe II relating to the "Invincible" Armada affirmed *"ourselves infinitely bound unto Almighty God in that it hath pleased him in his great goodness and mercy to bless your attempt"*, and asked Drake and Norris to transmit her thanks to *"Colonels and captains as also to the inferior sort of soldiers and mariners that has showed under you as great valour as ever nation did"*.[86]Between July and October the dismissed mariners, without money and being forbidden to enter London because of the sickness, provoked riots and began to practise highway robbery. Many were imprisoned

[83]Avelino Freitas de Meneses, *Os Açores e o Dominio Filipino,* II (1987), Doc. CXXVI; P.A. Tiele (ed.) *The Voyage of John Huyghen van Linschoten to the East Indies...*, II (London, 1885), 270-71, 275.

[84]William Fenner to Anthony Bacon, Plymouth, 1589, in Wernham, Doc. 164.

[85]"David" a D. Bernardino de Mendoza, Plymouth, 21 de Julho de 1589, in Rebello da Silva (ed.), *Quadro Elementar das Relações Politicas e Diplomáticas de Portugal...* XVI (Lisboa, 1853) 222.

[86]Cit. in Rowse, *op. cit.*, 288.

and condemned to death, according to a Spanish spy, one shouted from the scaffold *"the gallows is the pay you give us for going to the wars!"*.[87]

In Lisbon a procession of Thanksgiving took place on July 20th between the Sé and São Francisco consisting of all the orders and brotherhoods and important personnages carrying the statue of Nossa Senhora da Guia mutilated in Cascais by the English. Six weeks later in Rome (September 1st) Pope Sixtus V rededicated a new statue, composing a psalm and several prayers, and led 36 Cardinals and the whole Pontifical Court in another procession to the Church of Sant'Antonio dei Portoghesi.[88]

Fig. 5 - The tomb of Sir James Hales, treasurer to the expedition, who died on its way back to England. This is the only "monument" of the campaign, unknown until recently. (Canterbury Cathedral, Kent)

Aftermath

Drake proved that he was undisciplined, even with the Queen. A witness wrote that "a *book of martial ordinances set down to be holden in the army, as well at sea as at land...In the progress of the whole service...there was not one*

[87] Werham, *op. cit.*, Iviii. AGS. *Estado Francia,* K/ 1569, doc. 119 (18 e 24 de Setembro de 1589)

[88] Von Pastor, *op. cit.*, XXI, 469

jot thereof performed", [89] but the Spanish were not able to prevent either the landing or to impede the movements of the fleet. At the end of this bizarre campaign there were neither victors nor losers. It was as much a defeat of English strategy as a Spanish tactical (and moral) one.

In October Drake and Norris were incapable of justifying their behaviour before the Privy Council. Their answers about the abandonment of Santander and other accusations were evasive, in spite of the clear instructions from the Queen to destroy Spanish ships. They were accused by the Queen of behaving *"more for profit than for service"* and Drake, in particular, *"was much blamed by the common consent of all men, the overthrow of the action being imputed to him"*, [90] accusing him, above all, of failing to force entry into the Tagus. In fact, Drake's behaviour was less outrageous that on previous voyages. The initiatives of the Captains were curtailed by somewhat vague and cautionary orders imposed by the Queen. The failure contributed, apart from negligence on the part of the English commanders, to the habitual English logistical and sanitary deficiencies that undermined all their fleets at this time. The problem of religious antagonism, in spite of consulting favourably with the English Protestants, was correctly forecast by the spiritual leader of the revolt of the Low Countries, Phillipe Marnix de Ste. Aldegonde, when invoking strong distrust in the Portuguese Catholics, he refused the invitation proffered by D. Antonio to join the expedition and establish freedom of worship in Portugal.

Despite the fact that the campaign of 1589 confirmed the strength of the English navy and the naval policies of Elizabeth I, it also showed its limitations implementing these same naval policies, as the limitations of the Spanish Armada were also shown in 1588.

It became evident that both sides were incapable of annihilating the other creating a balance of forces in the Atlantic. The war against Felipe II would flare up again in the next decade in the form of small privateering expeditions against the Iberian merchant fleet.

Therefore the English *"rival Armada"*, although it had not gained much attention from historians of the two countries until this point, constituted without doubt an historic and military event, with implications that could have been important in the conflict between England and Spain. On the other hand, the taking of Lisbon could have obliged Felipe II at least to divert troops from other European possessions or even negotiate a peace in terms that were favourable to the English. Lisbon could have been maintained with Moroccan

[89] *"An Advertisement to the... Lord High Treasurer..."*, 15/25 February 1589, in Wernham, Doc. 173.

[90] M.A. Oppenheim (ed,), *Monson's Naval Tracts*, I, 178.

help and England could have benefited by the recovery of part of the Portuguese navy, reinforcing their naval strength and guaranteeing - in the short term - the dominion of the Atlantic. For some, like Roger Williams, was only left the pride of knowing *"the world will speak how 5000 Englishmen dared the Spaniards to battle at the gates of Lisbon"*, but after 1590 the threat of the Spanish Armadas was still as strong as before 1588.

In one of his last letters to the Queen, D. Antonio promised not to give up on his vow to return to Portugal, and hoped for support of the French King Henrique IV. However, he would have to wait three years for the liberation of his son, D. Cristovão, who had been kept as hostage by the Sheriff of Fez, which was only possible with the support of Elizabeth I and the Turkish Sultan, who promised to help him in a future fleet. Two days before the departure of Drake's last expedition - on 26th August 1595, the Prior do Crato died in poverty in Paris. *"Francisco Draque el viejo"* [91] died in January 1596 on the Caribbean Sea where his long fight against Spain began and Norris *"tormented with the stone"* [92] on his return from Portugal died a year later in Ireland.

—ooOoo—

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[91] Statements of prisoners captured at Grand Canary, 1595, in Andrews, *The Last Voyage...*, Doc. 22.

[92] Sir John Norris to Sir Edward Norris, Plymouth, 13 July 1589, in Wernham, Doc. 149.