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

The Dutch and the Dutch Portuguese War 1657-1661

by Professor JH Dalhuisen

1. Introduction

When I was at school in the Netherlands we were taught that the 1661 peace terms of the Dutch-Portuguese war were the sale by the Dutch Republic (or officially by the Republic of the United Provinces or the United Netherlands) of three countries, Brazil, Angola and São Tomé, to Portugal for 16 years of salt from Setubal. To us it sounded extraordinary, first that one could dispose of countries in this manner and then for so little. How was it possible that the Republic at the height of its powers should have been forced into this, where its adversary was known to be weak with considerable internal and external problems at that time ? How could Johan de Witt, its great Raadspensionary (position explained below) largely in charge of foreign affairs agree to such terms ? Much later after having acquired a place in the Alentejo, I often thought of this when crossing the Sado by ferry at Setubal and in the end I decided to look into the matter somewhat closer.

Presumably this peace deal had to be seen in a wider context. The first clue was that the Republic was involved in several wars at that time, especially with Engand and Sweden, and therefore the war with Portugal clearly had a lower priority. Then there was the Republic's own decision making process which was cumbersome and in matters of war formally, and in most other matters informally, based on unanimity between the seven Provinces that constituted the Republic. This unanimity was often not forthcoming and the result was not seldom confused objectives or, worse, paralysis even half way regarding big projects, certainly also in this case. Most important perhaps was that the Dutch usually thought in short term commercial term and logic, also in their foreign conquests. Their

own independence struggle had made them unlikely conquerors for any other than commercial reasons.

Of course colonial outposts were seldom countries in a modern sense and not considered as such until very recently but what was perhaps special for the Republic was that the mercantile attitude towards territorial advantage was all pervading and even applied to the own immediate vicinity in Europe.[1] In any event commercial aspirations were the only thing the Provinces and especially the two most important of them, Holland and Zeeland, were likely to agree on in their foreign policies. This was only different in the actions against their archenemy Spain of which the

[1] This was clear in the Republic's policy towards the Southern or Spanish Netherlands (now Belgium) after the peace with Spain in 1648. It was true that the stadholders, of whom more later, were particularly keen to retrieve Antwerp, the loss of which in 1585 had been very painful to the Republic and to the Princes of Orange personally as viscounts of that city. To them any retaking of Antwerp also became a welcome means, however, to balance the commercial power of Amsterdam that had greatly benefited from the loss of Antwerp and the subsequent closing of the Schelt river, eliminating Antwerp as a shipping and trading rival, a situation which would last until 1815. For these largely commercial reasons Amsterdam was fiercely opposed to the idea. At the time of Johan de Witt, discussions were held with France in 1663 on the fate of these Southern Provinces on large parts of which France had ambitions, given the much weakened position of Spain in the latter part of the 17th Century. France at first expected help from the Republic and, in this hope, concluded an offensive and defensive agreement with it in 1662. For many in the Republic the justification for this treaty was, however, in the favorable trade concessions it included and it was clear that the Dutch and particularly Amsterdam were not keen on the division France sought. The Dutch proposal was independence for the South with a few cities for France and, to counterbalance this, Bruges and Ghent for the Dutch but not Antwerp. This proved unattractive to France and the discussions were discontinued and followed, as we shall see, by much larger claims of France even to the southern part of the Republic.

Provinces had seceded in 1581 but with whom they reached a peace at Munster in 1648 in the context of the wider European settlement of Westphalia when the Southern Netherlands (now Belgium and Luxembourg) were finally lost for the Dutch cause. As a consequence, the Brazilian venture, with which Angola and São Tomé were directly connected, as these two countries provided the slave labour to make the Brazilian operations viable, was for the Republic hardly a matter of imperial prestige but foremost a commercial venture and it was likely to loose interest (that is unanimous support) once the economic prospects became blurred or the cost too high. This was exactly what happened.

The principal interest of the Republic in Brazil was the acquisition of additional sources of supply, in this case mainly sugar, for its considerable international trading activities, after Portugal had again become independent from Spain in 1640 and Spanish (political and financial) advantage through Portugal and Brazil needed no longer be feared and curtailed, certainly not after the peace with Spain in 1648. Portugal on the other hand sought to recuperate some of its former glory - although it also had a great need to increase its income - but it found little support and understanding for this in the Republic. It would seem that the Republic's commercial outlook not only limited its own foreign aspirations as just mentioned but it made it often also little aware that its adversaries could be motivated by other considerations like prestige, as in this case, or aggrandizement and pride. Particularly in the case of France and England (probably less so in the case of Portugal), there was also jealousy and resentment of a small rich Dutch upstart pushed forward by an uncommon sudden burst of energy and success in almost all parts of 17th Century life, with an unfamiliar decentralised government structure emphasising personal freedom and initiative[2] and with a broadly based industrious, calvinistic

[2] It would be wrong, as will be discussed more fully below, to consider the Republic a democratic state in the modern sense. It was an oligarchy in which the issue of the most important first merchants and of those who came later from Antwerp (the Brabant faction) after its fall in 1585 became the

mercantile attitude concentrated on international trade and leading for a while to a dominance of most international maritime trade routes.[3]

As a consequence of its own narrow outlook, the Republic could thus appear insensitive to others and incapable of accommodating what it often considered their irrational aims. The Portuguese suffered from this and did certainly not receive the sympathy which they expected from the Republic after their newly rewon independence from Spain and willingness to fight that country. But the hard nosed Dutch attitude did not pay this time and if they had shown some more flexibility at the beginning, the cost could have been contained and they would have been able to retain much more at the end.

Thus Portuguese War was one of several wars the Dutch were to fight after the Peace of Munster/Westphalia with Spain in

patriciate that decided everything, certainly in times when there was no stadholder as between 1650 and 1672, and again after William III died childless, between 1702 and 1747. The common people had no voice, neither in the States of the Provinces nor in the States General of the Republic. They were generally content with this state of affairs, were entirely free to criticise but could only exert influence through disgruntlement or revolt as happened in 1672 and in 1747 when, in both cases, they demanded and obtained the elevation of the Prince of Orange to the stadholdership at a time of crisis. There is no doubt that the population at large traditionally associated itself with the House of Orange against the patriciate. As a consequence, the roots of the position of the House of Orange in the Netherlands after the leadership role of William the Silent in the struggle for independence from Spain became increasingly populist - the Princes of Orange were aware of this and would therefore keep their distance to the local ruling classes and aristocracy - a situation which can be said to exist for the Dutch Royal House even today.

[3] Around 1650, the total Dutch sea going tonnage at the time was estimated at around 560,000 tons compared to France's 80,000 tons and England's 100,000 tons with a total merchant navy of around 8000 ships.

1648. As already mentioned this peace had ended the long independence war with Spain and had led to the full recognition of the Dutch Republic, not only independent from Spain but also from the Holy Roman Empire, of which until then its various Provinces had officially (and separately) been part. This peace freed the Republic to flex its considerable muscle and engage in a number of what were largely trade wars, fought mainly at sea where the Dutch were strongest. The English War between 1652 and 1654 was the first, to be followed by two further English wars within the next twenty years (in 1666 and 1672) in which access to English ports was at first the main issue. Between 1656 and 1660, the Republic also fought a war with Sweden to protect its freedom of access to the Baltic Sea and particularly to Danzig in Poland. Commercial considerations also lead to the war with Portugal in 1657, at least as far as the Dutch were concerned, but only after Brazil, where the Dutch never achieved a major foothold outside the Captancy of Pernambuco, had already been virtually lost in more incidental earlier military and naval skirmishes and the war with Portugal did not reverse the situation. The peace of 1661 was only a cover to confirm the retreat.

Soon there were other problems for the Republic, however, which made the loss of Brazil a minor event. Although these problems emerged a little later they were much more serious than the colonial disputes and it may be of interest to briefly relate what happened next. Indeed a war with the Bishop of Munster in 1665-1666 proved of a different kind and for the Republic more ominous as trade was not the issue, rather territorial claims. A land war followed between neighbours for which the Republic was increasingly ill equipped since there was no stadholder at the time (except in Friesland and Groningen) and therefore no head of a national land army (which office was combined with that of stadholder) during the minority of William III. There was no provincial unity in army matters and in any event the army had been seriously neglected since the end of the war with Spain had lead to demobilisation. With the help of France the Republic managed to fight off the invader this time but competitive jealousies and

territorial claims of its neighbours, now also of France,[4] almost made the Republic succumb in 1672 when Louis XIV, Charles II of England, the Bishop of Munster and the Archbishop of Cologne/Liege simultaneously declared war on it.

Although Louis XIV quickly reached Utrecht and had a mass sung in the old cathedral which was reconsecrated to the catholic faith (its aisle collapsed two years later), lack of urgency on his part saved the day for the Republic which kept the English/French fleet at bay but had remained ill prepared for a land war and was stunned by its defeats on land and the cowardice of many of its leaders in the beleaguered towns and fortresses. This breather left by the French allowed the Republic to recover just in time whilst the population at large regained its nerve after the elevation of the 21 year old Prince of Orange (William III, as of 1688 also King of England) first to the command of the army and later in the year - when popular discontent did not cease - to the traditional stadholdership. But the fight between the Republic and its neighbours had been a close thing and the Republic never fully regained its poise. In Europe it now had to accept the growing influence and power of its major and much older neighbours who had overcome their own internal problems: the Germans their thirty years war, the English their civil war and its aftermath, and the French their own internal turmoil culminating in the Fronde. The gradual decline of the Dutch Republic ending in its eventual demise

[4] As mentioned in Nt. 1 above, France under the young Louis XIV had its sights on much of what is now Belgium but subsequently also started to claim the Dutch territories below the Rhine in its policy to extend its borders to this natural divide. Below the big rivers the Dutch had some territories gained from the Spaniards during the Spanish war or as traditional heirlooms of the House of Orange, especially the barony of Breda, the traditional link between this House and the Netherlands, and the marquisate of Bergen op Zoom and the Lordship of Geertruidenberg. These territories were not Provinces and were, subject to the rights of the nobility in the area - mostly the House of Orange - ruled directly by the States General from the Hague. Maastricht, s'Hertogenbosch (Bois le Duc) and Breda were the most important fortified towns in this area and therefore the most desired by Louis XIV.

Given France's territorial ambitions (Louis XIV) but also its growing resentment of the Republic's trading position (Colbert), a conflict with the Republic could not have been avoided but that it emerged so soon was partly due to inept handling by Johan de Witt and the duplicity of both him and Charles II of England. It was well known that Charles II had French sympathies and envied Louis XIV his absolute powers. His foreign minister Arlington and (later) Parliament saw, however, the danger of the Low Countries being dominated by France and of a Spain that became too weak. On England's initiative, a treaty with the Republic followed under which both countries would offer to mediate between France and Spain on the future of the Southern Netherlands and if necessary force Spain to accept a compromise. Johan de Witt hesitated, being traditionally suspicious of England's and especially of Charles II's motives, but to the Republic and especially Amsterdam the deal proved attractive because it also included a trade pact favourable for the Dutch. Moreover, the English initiative was difficult to ignore. The normally pro-French Swedes were subsequently invited to accede in exchange for a considerable subsidy and the Triple Alliance was born.

In a secret clause, however, the parties agreed to force France to stand by its original more modest division proposals for the Southern Netherlands or otherwise for it to go back to the original frontiers which it had been changing by conquest. A deal was indeed worked out between France and Spain in 1668 at Aix la Chapelle on the basis of the original French proposals, but the French were not content and when the secret clause was subsequently leaked to them, they were indignant and considered the Triple Alliance an anti-French front instigated by the Dutch. They took it as an excuse to turn against the Republic and then started to push their claims to the Dutch territories below the Rhine. They wanted war, also to break the preponderant Dutch trading position, and began to prepare. In the meantime, as De Witt had feared, Charles II continued secret (personal) dealings with Louis XIV to financially support his anti-Parliament policy in England of which the French made use to undermine the Triple Alliance and to bring England - which had its own commercial grievances against the Republic - on its side in a war against the Republic. The result was the secret Treaty of Dover of 1670. Sweden was similarly bought off by France.

in 1795 dates from this time. Its heyday had probably lasted no longer than 50 years. It was too small to sustain its international role.

The Portuguese War had started 15 years earlier. Officially it began in 1657, but it had festered much longer, ever since the recovery of independence by Portugal from Spain in 1640 which, as already mentioned, gave the Portuguese the understandable desire to regain some if not all of their former empire. They expected the Dutch - who had taken many of the Portuguese overseas possessions, especially in Asia but also part of Brazil as bounty from Spain after Portugal became part of the Spanish empire in 1580 - to recognize them as equal victims of Spanish intolerance and to return at least some of their old overseas territories and trading posts. Although the stadholder of the time, Frederic Henry of Orange,[5] who died in 1647,

[5] The first stadholder had been William the Silent, Count of Nassau and through inheritance, Prince of Orange and Baron of Breda. He was appointed as stadholder by the States of Holland in 1572, four years after the revolt had started, even though, strictly speaking, his constitutional position was not clarified at the time and he operated under an *ad hoc* arrangement which gave him substantial political powers and also extensive authority in the army and navy. His true strength lay, however, in his role as tactician and in his persuasive talent. The office of stadholder was itself undefined and derived, as we shall see, from the Burgundian/Spanish tradition under which the ruler would appoint stadholders or representatives in some Provinces. Indeed, William the Silent had been stadholder of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht under the previous regime since 1559. Ultimately William the Silent was offered the sovereignty and the title of count but this was not in the manner of the old counts of Holland and Zeeland and his powers were to be greatly restricted. The Prince was reluctant to accept because he preferred a foreign sovereign to obtain foreign support. Before the situation could be formalised, he was murdered in 1584. He was succeeded by his son Maurits in 1585, again under the title of stadholder (first of Holland and Zeeland only), who remained unmarried and died in 1625 to be succeeded by his brother Frederic Henry in the same office, now for six Provinces (Friesland had its own stadholder from another branch of the Naussau family). Both Maurits and Frederic Henry benefited from the great popular respect and confidence in which their father had been held but also proved very able military leaders. Upon his death in

1647, Frederic Henry was succeeded as stadholder in six Provinces by his young son William II who married the English Princess Royal, sister of the later Charles II. He had an eventful period in office in which he tried to elevate the House of Orange and his own position to something more akin to a hereditary sovereign. The immediate issue in his struggle was the demobilisation of the land forces after the peace of Munster, neither of which William II had wanted but were both pushed through by Holland, Amsterdam at its head. Again commercial reasons were decisive. It culminated in an attack by the stadholder on Amsterdam which was cut of from its hinterland. Trade suffered, so a compromise on the demobilisation issue was worked out. It left a troubled legacy as the stadholder's attitude was deeply resented by the mercantile oligarchy in the towns of Holland. To their relief he died suddenly in 1650 of the small pox. His son William III was born 8 days later.

It gave the patriciate its chance and no stadholder was then appointed. The office was eventually even abolished by the largest Province, Holland. As there was consequently no army commander either, a post that was traditionally linked to the stadholdership of each Province which made a combination of forces possible, the land defenses became severely neglected which, as we saw, almost proved the Republic's undoing in 1672. This lead to a populist call for the young William of Orange, first as army commander and subsequently as stadholder. The merchant patriciate which was blamed for the debacle of the 1672 war, lost its primacy for the time being and Jan de Witt, who was its *de facto* leader, and his brother, who had much assisted him, were lynched. It was a considerable scandal but its impact proved in the end less decisive than would have seemed at first. The governmental experience of the ruling patriciate proved difficult to replace, and although the stadholdership and the positions of commander of the army and navy became heriditary in the male line of the House of Orange, the basic operational structure of the Republic was not changed. William III became soon occupied with foreign policy, notably the containment of France's ambitions in Europe, and after 1688 mainly lived in England. The fact that he died without issue gave the initiative back to the patriciate and a second stadholderless period (except in Friesland and Groningen) started.

Only during the Austrian war of succession when the French again invaded Belgium and the Netherlands, was the younger branch of the House of Nassau, that had been stadholders in Friesland (and sometimes Groningen), elevated to the stadholdership in the person of William IV,

had understood some of this and was willing to seek some accommodation, the merchant classes did not and they determined foreign policy through the States General as we shall see. It led to early incidents as the Dutch continued to consolidate their position in the East at the expense of the Portuguese and also continued their forays into Brazil. A truce was concluded in 1641 under which the Republic gave important naval support to mainland Portugal but eventually the Portuguese instigated an anti-Dutch revolt in Brazil during 1645, which they followed up by their retaking of most of the Dutch out posts in this country by 1654, when the last possessions in Pernambuco fell, after Salvador Correia de Sá had already retaken

married to the then Princess Royal, Ann of Hannover. Their son, William V, married to the sister of the King of Prussia and niece of Frederic the Great, was to be the last stadholder until 1795 when he fled to England. After the French occupation and the eventual incorporation of the Netherlands into France by Napoleon (in 1810), the stadholdership was not revived and a unitary state was created with the then Prince of Orange (son of William V) becoming the sovereign in 1813 and after 1815, under the rulings of the Congress of Vienna, King (William I) of all the Netherlands Provinces, including Belgium and Luxembourg, until the Belgium secession in 1830, after which the House of Orange continued to reign in the Northern Netherlands and (part of) Luxembourg (half of it went to Belgium) as a separate Grand Duchy with an own government.

In 1890 on the death of King William III when Queen Wilhelmina succeeded (under the regency of her mother Queen Emma until 1898), Luxembourg went to the German branch of the Nassau family as women at that time could not succeed in the Grand Duchy. The Principality of Orange had already long been lost to France during the reign of Louis XIV. After the death of stadholder William III (without issue) the rights to it were disputed between the Frisian Nassaus and the King of Prussia whose mother was the sister of William II, aunt of William III. The matter was settled in 1732 with the rights to the Principality going to Prussia. Thus the second title of the King of Prussia, later German Emperor, became Prince of Orange. The Dutch (Frisian) branch of the Nassau family was, however, allowed to use the title as a matter of courtesy and continued to style itself as Orange-Nassau to this day. In the Netherlands the Crown Prince now styles himself as Prince of Orange. The Principality itself was never recovered.

Angola in 1648 and the Dutch had been forced to abandon São Tome in the same year, which was also the year of the Republic's great peace with Spain. It was a severe loss of face for the Republic. Given its internal divisions - especially the city of Amsterdam believed less and less in the Brazilian venture, only the Province of Zeeland proved aggressively interested - the Republic had let matters drift and action against mainland Portugal was half hearted and proved ineffective. This explains why, when it came to the peace, there was little more to do than to save what could be saved from a lost cause. Yet there proved to be great wisdom in the salt deal of 1661. It was well implemented and eventually became a source of considerable cooperation between both countries.

To understand the situation more fully it may be useful to make a few remarks on how the Dutch Republic worked, on the position of Johan de Witt within the ruling classes, on his policy, and on the origin of the Republic's wealth and the role of the East and West Indies Companies in it.

2. The Functioning of the Dutch Republic, the Position and Policy of Johan de Witt

The Dutch Republic was in its time a singular phenomenon, largely outside the European tradition and both in its form of statehood as a Republic and in its constitutional arrangements a result of historic accident. It was hardly a unitary state, it did not have a sovereign head - although at first it had toyed with the idea - but was a Union of seven Provinces, which had until the time of Emperor Charles V, king of Spain, operated separately under a count (Holland and Zeeland united since 1323), duke (Gelre), or bishop (Utrecht and Overijsel), whilst in the case of Friesland and Groningen it was the local lower nobility that was effectively in control. By 1543 Charles V had through inheritance (Holland and Zeeland), persuasion (Utrecht and Overijsel) or war (Friesland, Groningen and Gelre) acquired the lordship over all these seven territories but except for obtaining a separate place for the Provinces within the Holy Roman Empire and in the matter of succession - and

notwithstanding constant attempts at greater centralisation - he had not managed to institute much communality. Each Province and its nobility were too intent on their own position and priviliges. Thus there was a lack of central power even within provinces like Holland and Zeeland that had been much longer part of the Burgundy/Habsburg possessions but had all obtained their own States and other privileges in exchange for support and taxes. This situation in each Province with their insistence on their own form of government and privileges thwarted any attempt at a more absolutist form of government for the region as a whole. A clear sign of this independence and individual treatment was that Charles V had often been represented in each Province through a stadholder or governor - the origin of this office in the Netherlands.[6] They would negotiate

[6] During the Burgundian era, the various stadholders would each report to Brussels where the Emperor during his frequent absences in the Empire was often represented by family members, first by his aunt, later by his sister, then - in the times of Philip II, his successor in Spain, in the county of Burgundy, in Italy and in the Netherlands after 1555 - it was the old Emperors's daughter (Margaret of Parma married into the Farnese family). Brussels thus was the centre of the Habsburg's possessions in the Netherlands (and Burgundy) which in the Southern Netherlands included 10 Provinces (including Luxembourg). Amongst these were Flanders, Hanault and Brabant. All had been acquired by Charles V as part of his Burgundy inheritance (through his grandmother). These southern Provinces were at first greatly more important than the northern Provinces. Of the latter, after the last conquest (Gelre in 1543), Holland was the most significant by far, so much so that to this day the Netherlands are often referred to by foreigners as Holland, much like the United Kingdom is as England. A great deal of what subsequently happened in the Republic was determined by the jealousies of the six other Provinces, although it should immediatley be added that Holland shouldered by far the largest burdens and loyally so. Another divide was that between the two sea-going Provinces, Holland and Zeeland which would often be together (but notably not in the Brazilian venture) and the rest.

It may thus be seen that originally the Netherlands or Low Countries were much larger than the seven Northern Provinces and included also all of what is now Belgium and Luxembourg. Only for a short period after the Congress of Vienna did all Provinces and Luxembourg unite into

with the local States and would each report separately to him or his representative in Brussels where his court resided.

The continuing provincial supremacy was a vital issue in the war against Spain notwithstanding its early support in the high nobility and the religious overtones at the start. It subsequently determined much of the functioning of the Dutch Republic in which the Provinces remained supreme and the central power depended entirely on them.[7] Although officially it was thought that the

one Kingdom of the Netherlands, see also Nt. 5 above, but this lasted only 15 years. The North eventually took the name and the South became Belgium and Luxembourg.

[7] In fact, although the struggle was in practice against Spain, it was certainly at first a struggle in the nature of a rebellion especially by the highest nobility and the States of the various Provinces against the local ruler, who also happened to be King of Spain, with a view to retain and expand their privileges. The religious and more populist element came to reinforce it, but was quite a different, often unruly, but vital element. Ultimately it was the States of each Province that came to conduct the war, especially those of Holland and Zeeland that were also the most impregnable, situated as they were on the rivers and the sea. The rebellion had itself nothing to do with Spain but all with the House of Habsburg, which as just mentioned, had obtained its hold in the Netherlands through their Burgundian inheritance and through further conquest. It was true, however, that since Philip II, his branch of the House of Habsburg which ruled in the Netherlands, the County of Burgundy (the Dukedom of Burgundy had reverted to France), Spain and its overseas possessions in the Americas, and large parts of Italy, had increasingly identified with Spain and Spanish attitudes. This had not been so under CharlesV (Carlos I of Spain). When the rebellion first broke in 1566-1568, the answer of Philip II was indeed to send Spanish troops under the Duke of Alba. In this way Spain became directly involved and ultimately the enemy.

It should also be remembered that strictly speaking, the ruler of the various Netherlands Provinces was not sovereign in these Provinces as they were part of the Holy Roman Empire so that the Emperor was the sovereign and the ruler in the Provinces a vassal, directly dependent on the Emperor.

sovereignty was vested in the States General which was a body of the Republic, the individual Provinces continued to behave as if they had the sovereignty for their territories themselves. They were ruled by their own States. The composition of each province's States was very different, but Holland had the greatest say in the States General, it is worth noting that since as 1585 the towns of Holland dominated its States and within those towns it was the oligarchy that ruled. Without the cities of Holland, nothing could therefore happen, neither at the provincial nor national level.

The result was an ineffective decision structure of which the Portuguese greatly benefited in their problems with the Republic in Brazil, as we shall see, and which at least partly explains the humbling exit of the Dutch from that territory and, in the event, also from Angola and São Tome. It is true that the need for discussion created a broad support for decisions once taken but the indecisiveness which often resulted could also prove greatly damaging, especially in times of crisis and war. In all instances, the question who was to pay for what, proved the major obstacle to effective government, as the Republic did not have its own taxation powers.

In fact, the Republic hardly had a constitution. The seven Northern Provinces, after it had become clear that the South would not continue the resistence to Spain, had concluded in 1579 the Union of Utrecht as a military alliance. It continued to have great historical significance and this Union document also started to serve as some kind of constitution after the secession from Spain in 1581 but it was barely usable for that purpose. Yet the Provinces could not agree on anything else. Much constitutional law therefore depended on ad hoc arrangements or custom. The Union document itself had mentioned taxing powers and a form of military conscription but these were never implemented. The powers to tax became subject to

Only under Charles V had the Emperor combined in his person this position and that of ruler of the Dutch Provinces.

unanimous decision of the Provinces. So were the decisions on war. In practice most major decisons depended therefore on unanimity whilst the financial clause was eventually replaced by a contribution of each Province according to fixed quotas (Holland alone contributed 59%). It naturally gave great power to Holland, but more importantly, as the Republic had no revenue of its own, the cost of each venture had to be separately agreed and distributed among the Provinces, several of which were often late in paying. On the other hand, in practice the system often allowed the Provinces that were willing to pay to go ahead without unanimity. In the Brazilian difficulties, the objections of Friesland that had particular grievances over the Dutch East Indies Company in which it had no say, were in this manner often ignored. Only when Amsterdam started to get doubts, the whole venture floundered.

As to its institutions, the Union continued with the old States General which had been operating in the Burgundian inheritance since the 15th Century, then as a centralising body of the sovereign. During the revolt against Spain, it had started to convene (illegally) on its own initiative since 1576 first in Brussels, then Antwerp, Middelburg and Delft, eventually settling in the North in The Hague. The States General were considered the supreme body formed by the representatives of the Provinces who were not independent and could only vote according to the instructions they received from their own provincial States, in Holland in turn dominated by the Cities and their patriciates as we saw.

Since the death of William the Silent (1584) when the final form of the new state remained to be decided, there was also a Council of State. This was not the continuation, however, of the old Habsburg Council of State which had operated in Brussels since 1531 to assist the sister of Charles V representing the Emperor in the Low Countries during his absence and which had included the most important nobility. In the Republic it was meant as the executive arm of the government. It consisted of independent members who voted by majority and had to consider the general rather than the provincial interests. Its jurisdiction was unclear, however, and it

became subservient to the States General which were subservient to the interests of the Provinces especially those of Holland and its cities. As Holland was underrepresented in the Council of State, it favoured the States General which as a consequence started to sit permanently as from 1593. This seems to also have suited the stadholder in his military tasks. The Council of State was thus reduced to presenting initiatives, especially in military matters and foreign policy to the States General and gave advice. As the only truly supra-provincial organ of the Republic, it was neutralised by the States General and could not decide anything.

As just mentioned the Provinces were ruled by their States, each in their own manner. Whilst the most important ones, those of Holland, which had started to convene at their own initiative since 1572, therefore also before the secession from Spain in 1581, were entirely dominated by their municipal patriciates, this was not necessarily so in the other Provinces where the remaining nobility might be more powerful and the towns less.[8] In Zeeland in

[8] It should be realised that during the Republic no new nobility was created. What there was as nobles were those created under the Holy Roman Empire or by its vassals. In Holland, there were few noble families left by 1795 and the title of count was itself in abeyance after the Habsburgs had given up their rights at the peace with Spain in 1648. There was only one barony in Holland (Liesvelt, belonging to the Frisian Nassaus) and several lower lordships, in theory all dependent on the count of Holland. In Gelre, the duchy and county of Zuthphen were equally in abeyance after 1648 - the duchy was offered to stadholder William III upon the suggestion of the city of Nymwegen in 1675 but the abandonment of the provincial sovereignty in this manner created much unease in Holland and Zeeland and the stadholder saw himself forced to refuse the offer. Of the two counties in Gelre created under the duke, Buren belonged to the House of Orange and Culemborg to the city of Nymwegen. There were a large number of other local lordships, created under the former regime. In Overijsel there was the lordship of Rechteren, Voorst and Twickel besides several others originally dependent on the bishop of Utrecht. In the North there had been minor local lordships, through intermarriage much reduced in number by 1795. Most of the local lords would eventually style themselves as barons. All of them were represented in the States of each Province and as such there was provincial

particular, the House of Orange had great influence in the local States through their marquisates of Vere and Flushing which made them the first nobles in that Province with an important vote in its States, even at times when they were not stadholder.

There were two important other offices in the Republic both in principle at Province level but with a Union function. These were the stadholdership referred to many times above and the raadspensionate of Holland. As we already saw, the stadholder had been an officer in the sense of a provincial governor since the time of Charles V. William the Silent had often been so styled and even when Philip II left for Spain for good in 1559, the Prince of Orange was appointed stadholder for Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht, reporting to Philip's sister as the latter's representative in Brussels. He resigned from this function in 1566, well before the outbreak of the revolt. There were other stadholders for the other Provinces. After the revolt became more successful in the North, obviously the stadholders could not as such function any longer. They now became functionaries of each Province, to start with the Prince of

nobility. After 1813 when there was a sovereign in the Netherlands, all were integrated in what then became the Dutch nobility which was much enlarged by the main families of the patriciate and also formed the upper Chamber of Parliament until 1848. All the old patrician families became entitled to the prefix 'Jonkheer', not a title of nobility, however, but hereditary in the manner of the English baronetcies.

In the new unitary kingdom after 1815, the duchy of Gelre and the counties of Holland and Zeeland were not revived. The only Dutch duchy is now that of Limbourg, vested in the Royal House. There was one Dutch principality created, that of Waterloo, given to the Duke of Wellington and now in the Belgian nobility.

In the formalistic protocol of the 17th Century, even in the Republic, the deserted former order still counted, however. Representatives of Gelre, *e.g.* in foreign embassies like the one to the peace talks in Munster, took precedence as representatives of a duchy over those of Holland which was only a county (because of its preponderance, it had, however, two representatives in the delegation). In precedence, Zeeland followed, then Utrecht, Friesland, Overijsel and Groningen.

Orange as of 1572 in Holland and Zeeland and as of 1576 in Utrecht. Later on, the House of Orange usually operated as such in five or six Provinces, except for the two stadholderless periods before and after William III. A younger branch of the Nassau family was stadholder in Friesland and sometimes Groningen, also during the time when there was no stadholder in the other Provinces.

The stadholdership was therefore a provincial office and in each Province, the stadholders' power was different but always limited. It was mainly in the appointment of magistrates out of a list of two presented by the local authorities, although there were variations per Province. For the stadholders there was, however, also the important function of head of the army in each province and often of the navy in Holland and Zeeland. In practice it unified the army for the Republic. This had been particularly important during the stadholderships of Maurits and Frederic Henry and the diminution of this role after the peace of Munster had given rise to considerable friction between the young stadholder William II and Holland. Eventually it lead to the lack of preparedness for war in 1672, aggravated because of the absence of a stadholder and head of the army in five Provinces in the immediately preceding period during the minority of William III. The stadholders would also give advice to and often be consulted by the States General in a variety of matters, notably also foreign affairs. In this manner they were able to exert more influence and, in any event, exerted considerable moral authority.[9]

[9] In fact, the stadholders out of the House of Orange, although in Dutch terms only functionaries of the various Provinces, maintained *de facto* a very different status. This was so first because of their decent from William the Silent, the leader of the revolt against Spain, but there were important other reasons. First as Princes of Orange, a principality south of Lyons, they were sovereigns in their own right. They also held major possessions in the Republic, like Breda, Geertruidenberg and Bergen op Zoom below the rivers, and Buren in Gelre. As first nobles of Zeeland (marquesses of Vere and Flushing), the Princes of Orange in fact dominated its States also during the period that they were not stadholders and could therefore also exert important influence in the Republic through this channel. Through their marriage policies, they became closely related to the royal houses of England and Prussia (Brandenburg). They were rich and maintained a style and court that was not unlike that of European heads of state. Their palaces in the Hague, Honselersdijk and at Het Loo were not large but sumptuous and of considerable beauty full of Dutch 17th Century art.

Much more modest was the set up of the Frisian stadholders, who resided at Leeuwarden until they came into the Orange inheritance after 1732 (shared with Prussia) and obtained the stadholdership for all the Provinces in 1747.

However, during the Dutch Portuguese war the stadholders did not play a role as there was no stadholder at that time. Earlier on, in the events leading up to it, the stadholder Frederic Henry had been favourable to the Portuguese, as we saw, and considered them welcome new allies against Spain, which was also the view of France, a country much favoured by this stadholder. At the time of the war itself, it was, however, the other provincial functionary, the raadspensionary of Holland, Johan or Jan de Witt, who was important

The raadspensionaries' office can best be described as secretary of the States of each Province. Naturally the one of Holland was the most important. He was in charge of the agenda, prepared and presided over the meetings of the States and also was one of their representatives in the States General, both the States of Holland and the States General residing in the Hague next to each other. At the level of the Republic, the raadspensionary of Holland acted as a kind of foreign minister. He conducted the foreign correspondence and received embassies, although as already mentioned, the stadholders often exerted *de facto* influence in foreign affairs (as did the Council of State), sometimes very considerably although in advisory capacity only. It follows that the position of the raadspensionary of Holland was the more powerful when there was no stadholder as was the case with Jan de Witt. Yet the States General always had the ultimate say and often appointed special commissioners to negociate with foreign powers and

embassies, certainly also with Portugal over the difficulties in the East and West Indies.

The office of raadspensionary was not without danger. The greatest raadspensionaries of Holland, Johan van Oldebarnevelt and Johan de Witt both paid with their lives, the first on the scaffold, the latter being lynched. The immediate cause varied but the deeper reason was in both cases resistence to the House of Orange in favour of provincial autonomy. In the case of Johan de Witt, who had been raadspensionary of Holland since 1653, his mistrust of the Princes of Orange has often been said to date from the treatment of his father, former burgomaster of Dordrecht, who a few years earlier had been taken prisoner under stadholder Wiliam II when the States of Holland had opposed the latter. In truth, the De Witts had long been exponents of the patriciate of the towns of Holland,[10] representatives and protectors of its powers and, as such, jealous and natural opponents of the influence of the Orange stadholders, all the more so as these stadholders were a truly binding force between the Provinces and as such promoted the concept of a unitary state.

There was also a policy reason. Because of the close relationship between the House of Orange and the English royal family at that time - William II had married the Princess Royal, Mary Stuart, mother of the later William III, who himself was to marry another Mary Stuart - Johan de Witt feared that Orange stadholders would be too close to England which he mistrusted. England was in any event an important competitor and both as a country and in population far larger than the Republic. This fear proved in the short term misplaced as William III showed in 1672,

[10] Dordrecht was traditionally the first town of Holland only later eclipsed by Amsterdam. Johan de Witt had, however, married into the powerful Amsterdam family of the Bickers and became through them also related to the De Graeff family, another important Amsterdam family at the time. The role of the Bickers was often contested. They were fiercely anti-Orange and were banned from office after 1672.

but it is true that when William III also became king of England after 1688, the Republic declined faster and started to become more and more an appendage to the English. Maybe this was unavoidable, but it was a justified concern of Jan de Witt who saw the independence of the Republic and within it the overriding role of Holland, and within Holland the central role of the towns and their patriciate, as the best guarantee for the continuation of its well-being and wealth. In his view, both England and France had to be contained, but he seemed to see England as the greater danger, although in the end France proved to pose the most immediate threat and was his undoing.

To sum it up, there was no single person or institution in the Republic that could alone decide anything. The States General depended on the States of the Provinces and could in major affairs only operate on the basis of unanimity. Especially in matters of war they had to be unanimous, although those who wanted to pay could often get their way. Even in the case of unanimity, the financial contributions had to come from the Provinces which were often late. The stadholder, assuming there was one, had only modest provincial powers and was as head of the army still dependent for policy and funding on the States General, which could not act without the Provinces. The Council of State was subservient to the States General and could not act at all. The Raadspensionary of Holland had an important role in foreign affairs but was ultimately again fully dependent on the often powerless States General. It is thus clear that the whole decision making process in the Republic was diffuse and inefficient. On the other hand it prevented rash decisions and adventurism.[11]

[11] The power structure in Portugal after 1640 which probably not less diffuse although very different. The new king did not rule as an absolute monarch and was surrounded by a variety of councils whose jurisdictions were not much better defined.

Nevertheless the constitutional arrangements were inadequate. Prince Maurits after the fall of Oldebarnevelt might have had a chance to change them if he had wanted too but he was not sufficiently interested. William II was interested but not trusted. William III after the fall of de Witt might have been in a good position to effectuate change but he did not pursue the matter either after he re-established his own position in the various Provinces.[12] Eventually he fully directed his attention to the European scene, the containment of Louis XIV and, in this context, his accession to the throne of England.

3 The Wealth of the Republic and the Role of the East and West Indies Companies

The true cause of the wealth of the Republic, which was poor in own resources (it produced only fish - especially herring although in great quantities but caught on foreign shores - bricks and some dairy products), in the 17th Century, was the willingness and ability of its merchants to take risk and act first as buyers and subsequently as sellers of most commodities. In doing so they were also able to organise the shipping of these goods to the Northern Netherlands (mainly Holland, especially Amsterdam, and Zeeland), store them for as long as necessary in their warehouses, finance and insure this often enormous inventory, and at the right time ship the goods out to the most ready buyer. The next step was the upgrading of their wares. Craftsmen of all kinds subsequently found their way

[12] At first it was doubtful whether Utrecht, Gelre and Overijsel could re-establish themselves as Provinces in the former manner as their behaviour in the war of 1672 had hardly been exemplary and Holland and Zeeland considered them conquered territory. William III insisted that they retake their former place in the Republic and was successful. As a consequence he gained great influence in these Provinces. As we saw in Nt. 8 above, Gelderland offered him the sovereignty as duke but he declined after the unease this caused in the other Provinces.

to the Republic which also boasted a good education system.[13] In this way the Dutch merchants became sometimes able to create virtual monopolies as nobody else could match their shipping, storage and upgrading facilities or were able to service and expand their sources of supply and their sales outlets in a similar coordinated manner.

They were initially much helped in their efforts by the closure of the Schelt river after Antwerp was retaken by the Spanish in 1585. It meant the end of Antwerp as a trading center in competition with Amsterdam. It also gave the Republic a trading monopoly in the Southern Netherlands. Most importantly, many Antwerp merchants left for the North. It was their money which made much of the early Asian ventures possible when the absorption of Portugal by Spain in 1580 rendered it impossible for the Dutch merchants to obtain the East and West Indian products through Lisbon. One hundred years later, the Republic had another major infusion of foreign talent and money when after the termination of the Edict of Nantes, Louis XIV forced the protestants (Hugenots) out of France. Many ended up in the Republic which became for them a natural second home. Generally the openness of the Republic to all foreign talent was well known. Portuguese jews were so welcomed when Spain started to prosecute them after 1580. The Republic's relative tolerance towards foreign life styles and religions served it well and strengthened it economically and financially, which in turn reinforced this tolerance.[14]

[13] Luxury articles like fine woollen cloth, gobelins, diamonds and Delft ware were exported to all parts of Europe. All that had to do with fish and shipping became Dutch specialities, including the building and equipment of merchant vessels and warships. They were at times even delivered to the enemies of the Republic.

[14] It cannot be said that calvinism itself was a tolerant religion. It was dominant in the Republic. Yet there remained strong catholic pockets and this religion was tolerated as long as there were no public religious services. The Union of Utrecht had left religion to the Provinces on the understanding, however, that no one would be persecuted because of his or

As to these sources of supply, the goods came at first mostly from Northern Europe (Dantzig, the Danish, Swedish and Finnish ports and even from the Russian ports of Novgorod and Archangel) mainly for grain, wood, iron and copper, subsequently from the Levant (the Smyrna trade) for carpets and other produce from Western Asia and from other Southern European ports like Lisbon/Setubal for salt and wine,[15] and finally from the colonial trade, until 1580 through Lisbon and when that became impossible when Portugal became part of Spain and thereby an enemy of the Republic,[16] often from posts in the East Indies taken from Portugal.[17]

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her faith. After the secession from Spain in 1581 it became the rule that only protestants could hold public religious services, not only the Calvinist but also the Lutherans of whom there were many among the foreigners, particularly in Amsterdam. The jews were also able to maintain major synagogues especially in Amsterdam; the Portuguese jews had one especially for them. Only Calvinists could hold public office, however. Nevertheles under the patriciate that held these offices, Calvinistic fervor was not always great. Amongst the stadholders, Maurits in particular had supported the stricter Calvinist factions. William the Silent and Frederic Henry had been more tolerant. William III again tended to be stricter. Officially they had no say, but William the Silent as leader of the revolt and his successors were often seen by the population at large (which tended to be more fiercely calvinistic than the patriciate), as defenders of their faith and the attitudes of the stadholders were therefore often conclusive in major religious disputes where they tended to side with the stricter masses rather than with the more lenient patriciate.

[15] There was even a fairly lively trade with Spain (Cadiz) under foreign flag, mainly for colonial products. From other Spanish ports the Dutch fetched wine, wool, citrus fruits and salt. This trade was naturally full of incident and the Spanish authorities tried to arrest the ships from time to time. After the peace with Spain in 1648, the Spanish trade increased rapidly.

[16] It is important to mention here that the Republic was at first most upset about the occupation of Portugal by Spain, for political and military reasons obviously, but no less because of the loss of the colonial trade with Portugal.

The sales outlets were at first mostly in France,[18] England[19] and Germany,[20] all countries weakened by internal strife and unable to

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The States General tried on several occasions to help the pretender Don Antonio, prior of Crato and an illegitimate sibling of the Portuguese royal house, to gain power, but at that stage in its own struggle with Spain the Republic had simply not the means to do much. When, however, in the wake of the defeat of the Armada in 1588, the English and Dutch sent a fleet first to successfully capture La Coruna in Spain and subsequently to liberate Lisbon, they found the Portuguese indifferent to Don Antonio. As from 1590 the Dutch therefore resolved to obtain their own trading posts in the East and later West Indies.

[17] In its heyday, one fleet of around 40 ships would go to the East Indies each year. Their return value, fully laden must in modern terms have amounted to at least US$ 15 million each (including the value of the ship), for a total therefore of around US$ 600 million annually. One reason why in 1672 and 1673 the Republic could maintain the war was that in both years it managed to preserve the Indies fleets (and also the Smyrna fleets).

[18] The trade with France had been extensive until 1648 but since France did not sign a peace with Spain in that year (only in 1659 in the Peace of the Pyrenees) and felt deserted by the Republic against Spain, trade suffered. The Treaty of 1662, see Nt. 1 above, eased the situation but after 1668 the situation again deteriorated and trade ceased altogether during the war with France between 1672- 1678. So it did during the Nine Years War between 1688-1697.

[19] The English trade suffered greatly when in 1651 the English passed the Act of Navigation which required all trade into England to be carried by English ships, except that ships of the country of origin of the goods could land them in England. It was not the immediate cause of the first Dutch/English War from 1652-1654, however, which came from a naval incident between the Admirals Tromp and Blake, but the bad relationship made this war possible. It went poorly for the Dutch, other trade also suffered, the population started to become restless and demanded the elevation of the two year old Prince of Orange (William III) to the stadholdership, all reasons for Johan de Witt as *de facto* leader of the patriaciate (and acting foreign minister since 1653) to seek a deal with Cromwell. In any event, the Dutch continued to trade with English ports for

organise themselves on a similar scale, but this changed and trade particularly with France and England became less dependable. There was naturally also a considerable return trade with the countries of the major supplies, mainly in Europe and the Levant. All trade depended on access and absence or minimalisation of import and export duties. These were therefore matters of major concern to the Republic and it sought as a consequence favourable treaties in these areas. If it was unduly hindered, it was willing to fight as the wars with England and Sweden showed. Similarly it was willing to fight for its sources of supply and their extension as was clear in the war with Portugal. To this end Dutch sailors would scout the whole world and after East Asia, they turned their attention to North America. Soon they also developed an interest in the Caribbean sugar trade. Then came Brazil, also for sugar.

At this stage, the role of the East and West Indies Companies should be mentioned. The East Indies Company (VOC) was created in 1602 and was probably the first limited liability company that issued shares to its participants which shares were

colonial products which the English could not obtain anywhere else. The second Dutch/English War in 1665 went much better for the Republic but concerned mostly possessions in North and South America. At the peace of Breda in 1667 it was agreed that the English would keep New Amsterdam (New York) and the Dutch Suriname, a remarkable exchange which shows that for supply and trading purposes Suriname was at that time as important to the Republic as New York. More importantly perhaps was that in this peace, the English surrendered all their claims to the Dutch East Indies where they had particularly contested the Dutch conquest of Ambon (Amboina) in the Moluccan Islands.

[20] The trade with Germany foremost took place up the Rhine river. Wine and wood were bought and herring, sugar, spices and luxury goods sold. Cologne and Frankfurt were the centers of this trade. From the north, through Embden, Bremen and Hamburg, the Dutch also accessed the Eems, Weser and Elbe rivers where they bought wood and beer and sold their herrings, sugar, spices and luxury products.

traded on the (Amsterdam) exchange. The immediate reason for its creation was the competition between various towns of Holland and Zeeland to open routes to the Indies and the result was a monopoly structure. No other Dutch shipping companies were allowed to compete with the VOC. The shipping companies constituted the original College of Directors, subsequently replenished by the burgomasters of each town represented in the Company. The College of Directors chose a daily management of 17 members from amongst themselves: eight for Amsterdam, four for Middelburg in Zeeland and one each for Rotterdam, Delft, Hoorn and Enkhuizen. Friesland to its increasing annoyance did not have a role. The seventeenth member varied between the represented towns (excepting Amsterdam). Shareholders had no influence on the management.

Originally, the VOC obtained an exclusive license for 21 years from 1602 to conduct the trade east of the Cape of Good Hope. As just mentioned this implied a monopoly in the Republic but also meant that in the territories that were subsequently conquered no traders from anywhere else would be allowed in. In exchange it paid an annual license fee to the Republic. It was allowed in its territories to conduct war and peace, recruit an army, equip war ships and build fortresses, always subject, however, to the final say of the States General who would also use the VOC and later more especially the West Indies Company in Brazil to wage war for it when that suited its purposes. The Republic had, however, to defend the license of the Company against intruders if it could not help itself. Hence the occasional involvement of the Dutch fleet in the conduct of the VOC's operations (and later much more in those of the West Indies Company). Nevertheless within the territories assigned to it, the VOC largely operated as sovereign and also initiated further conquests.

The original opponents were the Spanish and especially the Portuguese, who had not always been popular in the territories they held, but the real competitors ultimately proved to be the English who had created their own East Indies Company in 1600. At first

the Dutch East Indisch Company's possessions were limited to some of the Moluccan Islands and a small part of Java. It was the tough governor, Jan Pieterszoon Coen who in the 1620's was able to consolidate the Dutch position and take full possession of the Moluccans and Java. Twenty years later, the VOC added Malacca and part of Ceylon and Southern India (Coromandel and Malabar), until a truce for that part of the world was reached with Portugal at Goa in 1644. As a consequence of its policy, the VOC completely monopolised the trade in these territories and would regulate the supply of their products into the European markets. Although Japan and China were closed to Westerners, the Company was always able to maintain a small trading post outside Nagasaki in Japan and also managed to conduct trade with China via Formosa (until 1661).

The West Indies Company (WIC) dated from 1621[21] and had a very different origin and purpose. In the years before, the Dutch, with clandestine Portuguese support from mainly Porto and Viana do Castelo, had already been able to develop a substantial trade with Brazil regardless of the Spanish attempts to prevent this. The WIC was, however, primarily meant as a vehicle in the struggle against Spain and designed to capture the Spanish (and Portuguese) trading fleets from the Carribean and South America. Its other purpose was to start local trading posts in order to undermine the loyalty of the local population to the Spanish and Portuguese so that the income from their territories would diminish and preferably cease. The organisation was slightly different from that of the VOC. Involved were only Amsterdam, Middelburg, Rotterdam, Hoorn and the Provinces Friesland/Groningen (together). There were 74 directors from these interested parties and the daily management elected by them consisted of 19 members, only for 3 years each. Its exclusive license was granted for 24 years, the first renewal therefore being in 1645. Its allotted region was the West Coast of Africa and the East

[21] It was created immediately after the truce with Spain from 1609-1621 had ended. One of the conditions of the truce had been that no West Indies Company was set up by the Dutch.

Coast of (all) America. Because of the very purpose of the West Indies Company, the Republic was much more involved in its affairs than in those of the VOC, subsequently also because it proved far less self sufficient, especially after the peace with Spain, and the States General had much more influence on it and concerned itself much more with it than with the VOC. Like in the VOC, shareholders, of whom there were many small ones in Zeeland, had no influence on the management.

Pirating was thus one of the main aims and there was success in 1628 when Piet Hein captured the Spanish home bound fleet, a feat still sung in present Dutch folklore. Not until 1635 were substantial parts of the Capitania of Pernambuco conquered (Olinda and Recife in 1630, Rio Grande in 1633, St Augustin and Parahiba in 1634 and the Arraial containing fortresses around Olinda and Recife in 1635) after the Capitania of Bahia was won and lost in 1624/1625 when the WIC started to concentrate on Pernambuco that was the richest in sugar. To leave Bahia alone proved tactically a mistake as it left the Portuguese with an important defence base from which they later conducted a guerilla war against the Dutch and were able to first delay Dutch territorial success and subsequently to combat it. When the capable Count Johan Maurits of Nassau-Siegen, of the German main branch of the Nassau family - himself now best known for the Mauritshuis in the Hague which he had built[22] -

[22] Johan Maurits was not only a successful army commander but had much wider cultural and intellectual interests which he took to Brazil. He loved the country and took great pains to learn more about it. To this end he maintained a considerable court including important scholars, painters and craftsmen. Much of what became subsequently known about Brazil, its geography, population, culture, climate, diseases, wildlife and vegetation was the result of his interests and efforts. It is uncontested that he was the most important early explorer of Brazil and its potential. He was tolerant of the diversity of its population, instituted religious freedom, wanted the Portuguese to stay in the Dutch acquired territories, attracted all kind of adventurers, favoured the trade of others than the WIC (whom he belied would do better out of taxing powers than out of taking all the trade and risk

became the governor in 1637, there was some hope of enduring success and the Dutch possessions were extended, but the support he received from home proved too little to consolidate the progress although the supply of slaves increased after the Dutch were able to start to conquer some Portuguese territory in West Africa, first Elmina in Guinea in 1637. Angola and São Tomé would follow in 1641 and provide more suitable slave labour.

Johan Maurits' position had become more difficult, however, after 1640 when Portugal regained its independence. When a truce was agreed at the end of 1641 and the garrisons were much reduced, he protested and was recalled the next year by the near bankrupt WIC which found his operations too expensive. After much hesitation by the States General, they concurred with the recall and asked Johan Maurits to come back for other services. He did not leave before May 1644 and did not go unnoticed. Things got worse fast thereafter. It was clear that the WIC had imprudently relied on mainland Portugal to contain the situation in Brazil after the truce of 1641. It did not prevent the heavily indebted Portuguese sugar planters in Recife to rise against the WIC in 1645, no doubt with help from Bahia and the situation reached a low point when the admiral Witte de With deserted his commission in Brazil in 1649. By that time Brazil was already virtually lost for the Dutch - the last outposts in Pernambuco fell in 1654 - and so were Angola and São Tomé in West Africa which had been retaken by Portugal in 1648 after only seven years of Dutch dominance.

It proved the zenith of much of the ambition of the WIC. With the end of the war with Spain in 1648, the WIC's pirate role was now also finished. It was said that it had been able to seize 576 fully laden ships till then. Without this income, it lost its power and unavoidably became a more minor affair, dependent for major projects on the States General. Except for Surinam acquired from

itself and could in any event not alone supply the territories), and seems to have been genuinely popular.

England in 1667 and some small Carribean Islands (Curacao, Aruba and Bonaire acquired in 1640), it had lost all its territories. It continued to trade on a non-exclusive basis in South American woods, African slaves and Caribbean sugar. Ammunitions produced in the Republic were often traded in return. West Indian wood and sugar were commonly stocked and traded in the Republic according to normal Dutch practice which stored and traded everything in the home base. The West Indies Company, whose practices were often criticised even by its own employees, did not however have the temerity to start a slave market in Amsterdam.[23] After a few early years of profitability, bankruptcy was never far away and it could not compare to the continuing success of the VOC. During the Dutch-Portuguese War, it had no sufficient means of its own and operated virtually under the supervision of the States General and became financially totally dependent on the Republic's support. Part of the money came from the renewal of the VOC license in 1647 (together with that of the WIC) for another 25 years.

Both the VOC and WIC hardly survived the end of the Dutch Republic in 1795 and were both bankrupt by 1798.

4 The Events leading up to the Portuguese War

The above is a somewhat long but in my view necessary introduction to the Dutch Portuguese war because the Dutch attitude can only be truly understood against the depicted background. When the war started in 1657, the Brazilian territories were in fact already lost by the West Indies Company (WIC) as we saw. Matters had

[23] When earlier in 1596 a hundred negro slaves had been brought to Middelburg, they were immediately set free by the municipality and the experiment was therefore not repeated. The Dutch were on the whole latecomers to the slave trade and entered it reluctantly and on some scale only in the 1630's in connection with the Brazilian venture. There had been no place nor need for slaves in the VOC trade. The WIC's early attitude was not unduly severe (calvinistic attitudes were divided on the subject) but its later reputation was not good.

gone downhill fast after the expensive Johan Maurits of Nassau had been more or less fired by the WIC and had left Brazil in 1644. The truce of 1641 did not hold, although mainland Portugal feigned lack of knowledge of the guerrilla activities from Bahia. Recife was lost after 1645 and the last outposts in Pernambuco went in 1654. Angola and São Tomé were already lost in 1648.

On the home front the States General had hardly known what to do. The truces in the West and later in the East had lead at the time to much soul searching, differences between the Provinces and between them and the VOC and WIC who were against a truce. The WIC wanted a peace in which its position in the Capitanias of Pernambuco, Bahia and Maranhão were accepted. It is true that they did not have Bahia but they were planning to conquer it for which Johan Maurits had instructions and they believed to be in a good position (although as later transpired Johan Maurits himself thought a campaign against Bahia unfeasible). As for Maranhão, it was partly occupied by the Dutch and was thought of little consequence to the Portuguese and difficult for them to defend. Alternatively, the WIC was willing to accept a peace on the basis of the status quo.

This proved all unacceptable to the Portuguese who had sent Tristao de Mendonça Furtado - a former general who had fought the Dutch in Brazil - as first ambassador to the Republic at the beginning of 1641 to seek a) support for Portuguese independence and protection against Spain, b) to buy supplies and charter war ships and crews for which the new King Joao IV had set aside all the salt revenue for 1641, c) to prevent any peace deal with Spain at the expense of Portugal and its overseas possessions, and d) to retrieve the lost territories and to agree the policy with regard to further conquests of Spanish overseas possessions in Asia, the Caribbean and South America.

The States General were willing to support mainland Portugal and to send a fleet against Cadiz to seize the Spanish colonial fleet in 1641 although some Provinces were most unwilling to contribute to the costs. The States General showed themselves,

however, upset and appalled at the request for the return of territories (which centered particularly on Brazil and Guinea in exchange for an indemnification) which in their view were acquired in a just war against Spain and which Portugal itself had only obtained through conquest. They were willing, however, to share future conquests of Spanish possessions. Whilst there was thus support in principle for mainland Portugal, in the matter of the overseas possessions there was no agreement at all and this was to bedevil the negociations and the form of the treaty that was reached in June 1641 which was no more than a ten year truce to be followed by a peace later.

The ratification was held up in Portugal because of vivid disappointment with the Dutch refusal to return any territory. In any event, because of the normal communication problems at the time, it became only effective one year after ratification in the East and six months after ratification in the West (and immediately only in Europe), unless the truce instruction reached the relevant territories earlier when that date became the effective date for the end of hostilities. The ensuing delays gave the VOC and WIC precious time for further conquests and in this vital period Malacca and most of Ceylon were captured by the VOC and Angola, São Tomé and Maranhão by the WIC. Although Furtado's refusal to enter into an immediate peace on the basis of the status quo eventually allowed Portugal to recover Angola, São Tomé and Pernambuco (which the Dutch had always suspected to be the true reason for the Portuguese refusal to seek an immediate peace), the price was the loss of significant territory in the East, whilst in Africa and Brazil the struggle effectively continued which naturally had its effect on the support the Republic was willing to give to mainland Portugal, also in the context of its peace negociations with Spain. In fact the support function in the absence of an official peace also in the colonies, made the treaty of 1641 unworkable but it was the most that could be achieved in the circumstances.

These further conquests of the Dutch pending the agreed truce soured relations immediately which were not helped either by

the lack of success of the combined fleets (poorly equipped by the Dutch and joined by a better French contingent) before Cadiz in 1641. Moreover, it was not always clear who had what after the truce became known in the East and West Indies. Notably in Ceylon it lead to further hostilities which only subsided in 1644 when in Goa demarcation lines were agreed which left the Dutch with most of the island. All these problems lead to a new Portuguese embassy to the Republic now headed by Andrade Leitao, a lawyer, with as first aim to obtain a second Dutch support fleet. This was not exactly the best way to make himself popular as the States General had not even managed to settled the bills for the first one. Subsequently he asked for restitution of territory gained by the Dutch since the previous year, invoking the spirit rather than the letter of the agreement reached earlier when Portugal had refused a peace but had specifically agreed to the one year and six months delays, the effect of which were aggravated by the Portuguese lack of early ratification. Great was the irritation therefore in the Netherlands, probably also because the new Ambassador had no instructions for a peace that the truce treaty required. To make matters worse, rows with contractors in his residence lead to it being plundered. The instigators could not be found and although the States General insisted with the States of Holland, which were here competent, that the Portuguese Ambassador should be given satisfaction, nothing happened. In the meantime, the States General themselves started to play for time whilst Andrade Leitao had problems with his communications with his King. The end result was that relations deteriorated fast.

Yet there were early signs that things did not go all the Dutch way. Fever attacked the Dutch contingent in São Tomé which was for a while abandonned whilst in Maranhão the locals revolted against the WIC and drove out its troups. It gave the Portuguese in Brazil, if not at home, the idea to continue the hostilities indirectly through guerrilla activity, also encouraged by the end of Johan Maurits' rule. It is clear that the VOC and WIC were entirely mercenary even if they had the legal arguments on their side. The States General and certainly also the Stadholder saw this. The

former insisted with the Companies on some satisfaction to the Portuguese but were not themselves powerful enough nor probably sufficiently motivated to insist with them on moderation and on compromise.

Andrade Leitão thus achieved nothing which made the King move him on to become one of the Portuguese ambassadors to the peace conference between the Republic and Spain at Munster. He at first refused to leave but was officially replaced by Sousa Coutinho, a close confidant of the King, although Andrade Leitao also continued his activities with the States General whilst quarrelling with Sousa Coutinho. The result was more confusion but the emphasis had shifted from a second support fleet to inclusion of Portugal in the peace with Spain and the restitution issue. In view of the large income the VOC was obtaining out of their recent conquests and their powerful position, they were unlikely to return them and the States General were increasingly unlikely and perhaps unable to force them. The Portuguese understood this so that they concentrated on Brazil where the WIC was the weaker target as without much of its pirate income after Portugal became independent from Spain, they became for their funding much more dependent on the States General. Yet Portugal's two objectives remained contradictory as before: asking for support from the Republic in Europe whilst insisting on its concessions overseas. The States General could not entirely ignore the Portuguese requests, however, because of the support they found in France and by the ageing stadholder who had here the land Provinces on his side. These Provinces looked first at the war against Spain from which they suffered more than Holland and Zeeland, were little involved in the overseas possessions and begrudged the sea Provinces their prosperity. As to Brazil, Holland and Zeeland were ultimately decisive, however, as they were the Provinces most directly involved. Only when they fell out on this issue did the tide for Portugal turn decisively.

This happened when things started to go badly after Johan Maurits finally left Brazil in 1644. Many of the sugar planters were

heavily indebted to the WIC and those of Recife started to revolt in 1645 in the hope of getting rid of their debts together with the WIC. Contrary to expectations the planters had some success which gathered force with secret help from Bahia. Officially the Portuguese government affected lack of knowledge but from captured mail it became clear that it was perfectly aware of what was happening. To avoid a war with the Republic it had been willing to abandon Pernambuco but when the rebels were increasingly succesful it naturally started to adopt a wait and see attitude. Now the States General started to move and looked into support for the WIC. Yet Holland hesitated whilst the land Provinces, although, with the exception of Friesland, in principle willing to help, did not supply the money.

More important was that by now the Brazilian affair was completely overshadowed by the impending peace with Spain. Holland pushed for it, Zeeland was against it. Zeeland pushed for help for the WIC. As already mentioned, Holland (and especially Amsterdam) became more reluctant, officially because it did not want to aid the WIC as long as its finances had not been sorted out, but in reality because it did not believe that there could be a reasonable return in view of the scale of the help that was needed. But this help became the price Zeeland exacted for its support of the peace with Spain. It became a precondition and as a consequence a fleet was assembled for Brazil to carry 6000 soldiers. Portugal saw the danger and Sousa Coutinho, in the meantime reinforced by Antonio Vieira, leader of the Portuguese faction that wanted peace with the Republic, offered concessions amounting to three million cruzados for the Dutch rights in Brazil. Alternatively Sousa Coutinho was instructed to offer the return of Pernambuco but the States General and WIC doubted whether Portugal could deliver and were at that moment not in the mood to sell trading posts for money although the Stadholder supported the idea. The amount was in the meantime increased to eight million cruzados (without proper authorisation) but the WIC maintained that this was not even enough to cover its debt. Zeeland continued to insist on a relief mission but it took months to assemble and precious time was lost. In the

negociations, the issue of restitution of territory by the Portuguese was now at the center and the States General asked for security in the form of a Dutch garrison in Bahia. Sousa Coutinho offered the fortresses of Setubal, Viana and Aveiro instead. Whilst equipping their fleet, the States General upped their demands and now also wanted Maranhão back, besides all of Pernambuco, and 280 tons of gold as indemnification (the yearly income from Brazil was estimated at 150 tons of gold). Where local currency was used (the cruzado), one million of them equated about 10 tons of gold.

In the meantime, Joao IV assembled his own support fleet but had the greatest (financial) difficulties to get it together. Yet he managed, was quicker and his fleet had no difficulty in the crossing. The Dutch on the other hand were late and their fleet suffered greatly from storms. In bits and pieces it reached Brazil only in March 1648. The transport of soldiers had greatly suffered and they were not successful on land. The Portuguese avoided contact at sea in order not to give the Republic a *casus belli*. This allowed Correia de Sá to divert to Angola and re-conquer Luanda and São Tomé, reinforcing the slave supply for the Portuguese possessions in Brazil. It was a severe blow to the Republic and it did not fail to impress. The States of Holland under the leadership of Amsterdam now suggested that the negociations should continue in earnest and no longer be based on the (exorbitant) demands of the WIC. But the capture of many loaded Portuguese vessels soon compensated for the military losses and the Dutch demands remained high although they abandoned their claims to Maranhão, left Bahia out of their proposals but continued to insist on restitution of Pernambco, Luanda and São Tomé.

The weary Portuguese then recalled their ambassadors who had been largely left without instructions and had been forced to act on their own authority. The States General did not let Sousa Coutinho go, however, because he could not pay his private debts. He was only allowed to leave in 1650 having barely escaped an attack on his home by the Hague mob and was succeeded by Sousa de Macedo. The States General in the meantime sent a small support

fleet to Brazil in 1649. They wanted to use more force whilst not all was lost but the Amsterdam opposition in favour of negociations and its interest in the trade with Portugal especially in its salt contracts, became stronger. It was clear that both protagonists were awaiting news of their successes or lack thereof on the battle fronts in Brazil.

5 The Portuguese War

The above gives the flavour and the problems the Republic had with Brazil. In fact the Basilian ventures were overshadowed first by the peace with Spain, which as we saw was finally concluded in 1648, then by the differences between Holland and Zeeland in which Zeeland prevailed only in the short term making help to the WIC an issue for its support of the Munster peace with Spain. Thereafter there were the serious domestic problems between Amsterdam and the new Stadholder, William II, in 1650, who was in, any event, more interested in resuming the war with Spain on the side of France than in war with Portugal. Subsequently his sudden death in the same year with only an infant son (the later William III) lead to a new political balance in the Republic in which the patriciate became all dominant, Amsterdam at its head. But Amsterdam was not all powerful which became clear when ratification of an important treaty with Denmark was held up by Zeeland in 1650 failing Holland's support for Brazil.

Amsterdam relented but the death of the Stadholder held matters up well into 1651. Macedo Coutinho was now all the keener to offer further concessions in terms of indemnifications and trading privileges but no restitution of territory. The States General (unwisely in retrospect) wanted all or nothing, broke relations in 1651 but did not take action, neither in Europe nor in Brazil. A difficult war with England followed between 1652 and 1654 and took all resources. In 1656 there followed a war between the Republic and Sweden, another important diversion. Amsterdam's main interests lay here. In the meantime Jan de Witt, scion of the patriciate of Holland and through marriage closely related to the Amsterdam patriciate had become the Raadspensionary for Holland

in 1653, replacing the orangist and poet Cats. He was likely to concentrate also on the problems closer home. This all worked in Portugal's favour. Yet in Portugal Joao IV faced formidable problems of his own. He was at war with Spain, maintained only a fragile truce with the Republic which could turn into war at any time, and risked war also with England where he had offended the new Commonwealth of Cromwell. His natural ally, France, was paralysed by the Fronde until 1653. Thereafter France (Mazarin) showed itself disappointed about the Portuguese help in the war against Spain which was only terminated in 1659. The Dutch-English war allowed Portugal to settle its differences with England, however, albeit at great cost, and it obtained an important ally.

It also helped that in Brazil things did not turn out well for the Republic, although it increased the Dutch naval threat to mainland Portugal. Of the original relief fleet the Dutch had sent to Brazil at the end of 1647, little was left by 1649 after a second defeat at Guararapes. The small support they sent in 1649 unaware of the scale of this defeat gave the Dutch settlements some respite in 1650 and also brought some vital food rations but only for a limited number of months so that hunger and famine was never far away. Under these circumstances, the commander Witte de With had already deserted and returned to the Netherlands in 1649 with two ships creating a major political headache as to what to do with him, which pitched the States of Holland further against the States General. The 1650 support ships returned in 1651 leaving the Dutch in Brazil without vital protection. Large bills remained to be settled between the Provinces in respect of the help so far provided. Only Holland, that was most doubtful, had paid up. It did not help the formulation of any future strategy.

Portugal in the meantime continued to insist on a negociated settlement through its embassy in Paris. It probably understood that the Dutch heart was less and less in the venture and that the Dutch merchants could be taken up in their mercenary attitudes, to be bought off with money and large trade concessions, whilst the WIC (unlike the VOC which now felt free to take Colombo in Ceylon)

was not able to make its power felt. In the restitution issue, the Republic now seemed willing to leave Pernambuco to Portugal except for the main coastal cities and against a lump sum payment, but the war with England which went badly started to consume all attention especially of the new Raadspensionary Jan de Witt. Portugal now took action and reconquered Recife in the beginning of 1654. The other settlements followed within the month. It was the end for the Dutch in Brazil. The States General did nothing except slowly dealing with the claims of returning military and settlers. But they gave the VOC a free hand in the East. The ten year truce was in any event coming to an end there and all of Ceylon and much of the Portuguese settlements in India (except Goa and Bombay) were lost.

Now the prudent Joao IV died (1656), leading to a regency under his wife Queen Luisa. It gave the States General a reason to reconsider their position and they decided on action. Even Amsterdam abandoned its opposition, being less burdened by other political problems at that time whilst it thought that it was a good moment for Portuguese concessions. The aim remained to recover Pernambuco in Brazil and Angola and São Tomé in Africa. The States General also meant to receive a large indemnification in gold, in short, they insisted on the terms of 1648 and a fleet was assembled to sail to Portugal to obtain these concessions or something similar or otherwise to declare war.

The Dutch fleet arrived before Cascais in September 1657 but Portugal refused the conditions in reliance on support from England and France. War was then declared, France tried to mediate, the Dutch were willing to give up Angola provided there would be free trade in goods and slaves, but no more. Action of the fleet was limited, however. The most important feat was that fifteen of the seventy ships of the Brazilian fleet of that year were taken but Lisbon was well left alone, protected as it was by a small English fleet under Admiral Stoakes. The Dutch certainly did not want another war with England and their fleet returned to the Republic in November, the practical end of the war, after further instructions of the States General to remain in place had failed to reach it in time.

A new fleet for the next year was then considered but the great problems that Portugal was experiencing with Spain raised concerns especially in France and also in England. Both countries offered to mediate. But war with Sweden proved the decisive factor for the Dutch where France was its only ally against Sweden and England, which were trying to close the Baltic to the Dutch. Consequently the States General gave in to French pressure. The new Portuguese ambassador, Telles de Faro, now offered two and a half million cruzados as indemnification, partly in (local) money, partly in products, but this was not considered enough. It was about one tenth of what the Dutch had wanted in gold in 1648.

He also wanted concessions in Ceylon in exchange for a general peace, but eventually the discussions concentrated on a) the indemnification where the Republic wanted twelve million cruzados payable in 12 years partly in gold and products, mainly salt from Setubal, on b) the trading rights and conditions in Portugal, Brazil and Africa where the Republic wanted rights comparable to those of France and Engand, and on c) indemnification of the Dutch settlers and of the WIC that had lent them and the Portuguese within their territories much money. Johan de Witt now took the lead for the Republic and eventually reduced the indemnification to five million. For all practical purposes, restitution of land was abandoned although not officially so since six Provinces still wanted it. In the meantime the French and English started to pressurise the Portuguese but without immediate success and hostilities therefore continued especially in the capturing of each others vessels. Portuguese products were banned from the Republic but this ban proved hardly successful whilst Amsterdam was against a full blockade of Portugal. Telles de Faro's mission, in the meantime, came to an ignominious end when he was found to have started discussions with the Spanish ambassador, fled to the Spanish embassy and eventually to Madrid where he was enobled by the Spanish king. His secretary Luis Alvares de Ribeira then took his place, at first without instructions.

It is not necessary to follow here the details of the negociations after the parameters were substantially reset in the above manner. The Dutch, especially Holland, were tired of Brazil and had other more pressing concerns. On the other hand the peace between Spain and France in 1659 and the confusion in England after the death of Cromwell in 1658 limited the support of these countries for Portugal which had therefore also to rethink its position. Jan de Witt now started to negotiate for Holland only and it came to a formulation of a proposal for a Treaty. It should be realised that this was not an agreed text as Holland could not bind the Republic and therefore Portugal had no need to consent either. It contained in fact the minimum terms on which Holland would agree a peace and they were presented as a recommendation to the States General. In the text, the indemnification was set at four million cruzados payable in sixteen annual installments partly in cash and products, including salt from Setubal where the Republic would obtain a monopoly at market prices to be determined from year to year, whilst toll reductions in Portugal by Dutch ships would also be deducted. These tolls should in any event not be higher than those of 1653. The Dutch would be free to buy produce and sell their own products including weapons and ammunition in the Portugal and its territories. Trade between Portugal and Brazil would be allowed to the Dutch on the same conditions as for the Portuguese. As to the outstanding claims of the Dutch and WIC in Brazil, they would have to be paid and where real or personal property had been taken from private citizens, they would be returned. The Dutch and their families would be free to live in Portugal and its colonies and their religion would be respected.

Ribeiro had proved a success in narrowing the differences and was rightly disappointed when he was not allowed to complete his task which was left to the new Portuguese ambassador, D.Henrique de Sousa de Tavares, Conde de Miranda. It would be another two years before the final terms were agreed however. Eventually the States General accepted these terms by majority only, Zeeland and Gelre remaining opposed till the end but this did not prevent ratification on this occasion. Much had happened in

between. In England Charles II was restored and proceeded to marry the Portuguese Princess Catherine of Braganza (acquiring Bombay as part of the dowry). Subsequently, England started to intervene and offered at first its help but later attempted to object and delay when it feared that the Dutch would obtain the same trading privileges from Portugal as the English had. Miranda was not insensitive to English pressure. If anything, it made Holland more eager to reach a conclusion and it used all its influence to soften up the other Provinces but at first without much success as the States General became deadlocked when especially Zeeland, Gelre and Groningen continued to insist on land restitutions. When. however. at last there was a majority in the States General in favour of the Holland draft, De Witt sent an ultimatum to Miranda to either stop succumbing to English pressure or to leave the country. On August 6th 1661 the Treaty was signed.

Its implementation proved a great success. Although the Republic had negotiated a possibility to surrender the salt deal at Setubal if it did not work out, it created a close and lasting friendship. The annual discussions on price did not prove a substantial problem. The deal proved advantageous to the Republic which had first feared that its monopoly at Setubal would be eroded by supplies from elsewhere in Portugal, France and Spain. This did not happen. For Portugal the free hand in Brazil and Africa proved beneficial and a considerable asset in the 18th Century. The price had been further losses in the East, especially in Malacca and Ceylon but at least Portugal's pride was intact. It had had a lucky escape as it had been fully able to take advantage of the Republic's other political preoccupations at the time, its internal divisions, and its merchant spirit in which the short term lure of money and trade concessions were in the end as potent as longer term territorial ambitions, certainly when the cost of conquering and consolidating the conquest proved too high. From an extremely weak position Portugal was thus able to rebuild its empire. Much of the credit for

this should go, I think, to Joao IV. He may not have lived to see the result, but by the time he died, most of the work had been done.[24]

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[24] The most relevant books on the subject of the Dutch-Portuguese conflict concerning Brazil are Edgar Prestage, The Diplomatic Relations of Portugal with France, England and Holland from 1640 to 1668, Watford 1928; CR Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil 1624-1654, Clarendon Press 1957; and C van de Haar, De Diplomatieke Betrekkingen tussen de Republiek en Portugal 1640- 1661 [The Diplomatic Relations between the Republic and Portugal 1640-1661] Dissertation Amsterdam 1961. Van de Haar is generally critical of Prestage.